People v. Venancio-Hernandez — Illinois appellate court affirms 14-year sentence for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child

Case
People v. Epigmenio Venancio-Hernandez
Court
Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Sixth Division
Date Decided
June 12, 2026
Docket No.
1-25-0329
Topics
Criminal sentencing, Sexual assault, Abuse of discretion, Child victims

Background

Epigmenio Venancio-Hernandez, the live-in boyfriend of the victims’ mother, was convicted by a jury of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child under age 13 (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1)) in the Circuit Court of Cook County. The offense arose from an incident in which Venancio-Hernandez called the victim, An.S., who was eight or nine years old at the time, into a bedroom while her mother was at work, placed his hand on her thigh, moved it up her inner thigh, and touched and rubbed the skin of her vagina under her underwear. He smirked throughout and, as she left, told her not to tell anyone. A second incident involved him grabbing and squeezing the same victim’s buttocks while simultaneously grabbing his own groin area. The older sister, Ar.S., also testified that he had grabbed her breast while she slept when she was thirteen or fourteen years old.

At sentencing, the court considered a presentence investigation report (PSI) reflecting that Venancio-Hernandez had three pending cases, five prior convictions including a 2009 felony aggravated DUI, and a personal history of poverty, an absent father, limited education, and immigration from Mexico at age thirteen. The court also heard victim impact statements from both An.S. and Ar.S. describing lasting psychological harm, fear, and lost innocence. Defense counsel emphasized Venancio-Hernandez’s difficult upbringing, limited education, and steady work history and requested the minimum sentence. The State introduced evidence of the additional pending cases involving further alleged sexual touching of both victims.

The trial court sentenced Venancio-Hernandez to 14 years in prison — on the low end of the 6-to-60-year statutory range. He appealed, arguing the sentence was excessive in light of the specific facts of the offense, his minimal criminal history, his rehabilitative potential, and the State’s prior six-year plea offer, which he had declined.

The Court’s Holding

The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the 14-year sentence in its entirety, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court. The appellate court rejected the argument that the offense involved only the “least serious” conduct under the statute, noting that Venancio-Hernandez occupied a position of trust and authority over a young child, issued what the trial court reasonably characterized as a threat to stay silent, and caused documented and lasting psychological harm to both victims. The court found the trial court had made a thorough record and considered all relevant aggravating and mitigating factors.

The court also rejected the argument that the trial court had inadequately weighed Venancio-Hernandez’s minimal criminal history or rehabilitative potential. The record showed the trial court expressly acknowledged his history as modest and nonviolent, and the appellate court presumed the court considered the mitigating evidence presented through the PSI. Under settled Illinois law, the seriousness of the offense is the paramount sentencing consideration, and a defendant’s rehabilitative potential is not entitled to greater weight.

Finally, the court held that the State’s rejected six-year plea offer was legally irrelevant to the sentencing analysis. Because the trial court played no role in the plea negotiations, whatever the State may have offered pretrial does not bear on whether the court abused its discretion in fashioning a sentence after trial. The court noted that Venancio-Hernandez received a sentence 46 years below the statutory maximum.

Key Takeaways

  • A sentence at the low end of the statutory range is presumed proper and will be upheld absent a showing that the trial court acted arbitrarily, fancifully, or unreasonably.
  • Under Illinois law, the seriousness of the offense is the most important sentencing factor; a defendant’s rehabilitative potential does not outweigh it.
  • A rejected pretrial plea offer is irrelevant to post-trial sentencing review where the trial court was not involved in the plea negotiations.
  • A trial court’s instruction from a defendant to a child victim not to disclose abuse may reasonably be characterized as a threat, consistent with Illinois precedent on delayed reporting in child sexual abuse cases.

Why It Matters

This decision reinforces the broad deference Illinois appellate courts extend to trial court sentencing decisions, particularly in predatory sexual assault cases involving child victims. Defense arguments that frame an offense as falling at the lower end of the statutory conduct range will carry limited weight where the totality of the circumstances — the victim’s age, the defendant’s position of trust, the lasting psychological harm, and the defendant’s conduct toward the victim — support a higher sentence within that range.

The ruling also serves as a clear reminder that defendants who reject plea offers and proceed to trial cannot later use the rejected offer as a benchmark to challenge a longer post-trial sentence. Attorneys handling similar cases should note that only the trial court’s own involvement in plea negotiations — not the mere existence of an offer — could make plea terms relevant to appellate sentencing review. This is an unpublished Rule 23 order and is not precedential except in the limited circumstances provided by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(e)(1).

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