Background
On July 14, 2023, sixteen-year-old Courtney Frederick was driving a Toyota Highlander owned by her stepfather, Jorge Sigler, in Lincolnwood, Illinois. Frederick testified she had stopped at a four-way intersection and turned onto Navajo Avenue when plaintiff Wafa Rayan drove out of a private driveway and collided with her vehicle. Frederick had been licensed for approximately ten months and had been involved in a prior accident in November 2022, a fact Sigler was aware of when he continued to lend her the vehicle.
Rayan filed suit in Cook County alleging negligence against Frederick and negligent entrustment against Sigler. After a one-week jury trial, the jury returned a verdict of no liability on both counts. During closing argument, defense counsel had asked jurors to consider what it would mean for parents generally if Sigler were found liable for entrusting his car to a teenager who had been in a prior minor accident — essentially inviting them to think about the policy consequences of a liability finding. The circuit court sustained plaintiff’s objection to that argument and directed defense counsel to focus on the reasonable-person standard.
Rayan moved for a new trial, arguing defense counsel’s remarks constituted an improper “golden rule” argument that prejudiced her case. The circuit court denied the motion after a hearing, and Rayan appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the denial of the new trial motion, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion. The court found it was not even clear the remark qualified as a classic golden rule violation because it appealed to general policy implications for parents rather than asking jurors to place themselves specifically in Sigler’s shoes — and thus did not improperly inflame the jury’s passion or sympathy.
Even assuming the remark was improper, the court found no substantial prejudice. Critically, the jury first found Frederick — the driver — not liable for the underlying accident. Under Illinois law, an entrustor generally cannot be liable under a negligent entrustment theory if the entrustee is not found liable; that finding broke the chain of causation as to Sigler. The allegedly improper argument therefore could not have changed the outcome. The court also noted the remark was brief and isolated within a week-long trial, the circuit court promptly sustained the objection, and nothing in the record suggested the verdict stemmed from passion or prejudice rather than the evidence.
The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that sustaining the objection was insufficient because defendants had themselves moved in limine to bar golden rule arguments. While prior cases recognize that a sustained objection might not cure a violation of a motion in limine, that is not a per se rule; the ultimate inquiry remains whether the verdict was actually affected by the remark.
Key Takeaways
- A golden rule argument does not require a new trial unless it causes “substantial prejudice” — meaning the outcome would have been different absent the remark; a brief, isolated comment cured by a sustained objection generally will not meet that standard.
- In a negligent entrustment case, if the jury finds the driver (entrustee) not liable for the underlying accident, that finding independently defeats the entrustment claim against the vehicle owner, regardless of any other trial error directed only at the entrustment count.
- The fact that the moving party obtained a motion in limine barring golden rule arguments does not automatically render an opponent’s similar argument incurably prejudicial — courts still assess actual impact on the verdict.
Why It Matters
This decision is a practical reminder that closing-argument misconduct claims face a high bar on appeal. Illinois courts consistently defer to the trial judge — who observed the full trial and the jury — to assess whether an improper remark actually moved the needle. Attorneys seeking a new trial on this ground must point to evidence that the jury’s verdict reflected passion or prejudice, not merely that opposing counsel crossed a line.
The ruling also reinforces a structural feature of negligent entrustment litigation: the entrustor’s liability is derivative of the entrustee’s. Defense counsel in multi-defendant auto cases should recognize that winning on the driver’s liability first can collapse the entrustment count as a matter of causation, even if other trial issues arise.