Background
In 2006, Leonard Michael King took the victim on a car ride against her will, eventually stopping at his uncle's house. King told the victim she would have to have sex with the uncle and laughed while the uncle raped her; the uncle then gave King $10. In 2008, a jury convicted King of rape in concert and sexual battery, and in bifurcated proceedings the trial court found true a prior strike, a prior serious felony, and a prior prison term. The court sentenced King to an aggregate 32-year prison term, including upper terms doubled by the strike, plus a $4,800 restitution fine. This court affirmed the judgment in 2011.
The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified King as eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75. In 2024, the trial court appointed counsel and ordered briefing. King asked the court to shorten his aggregate sentence, dismiss the now-invalid prior prison term enhancement, and strike his prior strike and prior serious felony enhancement, arguing that at 43, after 18 years in custody and with rehabilitation, he posed no risk of violence. The prosecution asked the court to dismiss only the prior prison term enhancement and otherwise leave the sentence unchanged.
In April 2025, the trial court dismissed the prior prison term enhancement but otherwise left the sentence unchanged, for a new aggregate term of 31 years. The court found true beyond a reasonable doubt that King had served a prior prison term, an aggravating factor that outweighed any mitigating factors, and reimposed all other terms, including all fines and fees except the now-invalid jail booking and classification fees. King timely appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal rejected King's contention that the trial court erred in reimposing the upper term based on aggravating factors neither stipulated to nor found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. Following People v. Brannon-Thompson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455, the court held that section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) permits a court to reimpose an upper term regardless of current law requiring a stipulation or jury finding, and it declined to diverge from that holding while the California Supreme Court has granted review in People v. Eaton. Because section 1170, subdivision (b)'s factfinding requirements do not apply when reimposing the upper term during a section 1172.75 resentencing, the Sixth Amendment is not implicated.
The court also rejected King's reliance on People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069. Wiley interpreted section 1170, subdivision (b)(3)—allowing sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without a jury—as limited in scope, but it did not affect a court's ability to reimpose the upper term under section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4). Given these conclusions, the court did not reach the People's alternate argument that the trial court's beyond-a-reasonable-doubt finding that King had served a prior prison term independently supported the upper term.
On its own review, however, the court found the trial court erroneously reimposed the $4,800 restitution fine under section 1202.4, subdivision (b), even though King was originally sentenced in 2008. Section 1465.9, subdivision (d) mandates vacating these fines after 10 years; because the fine was imposed more than 10 years ago, any balance is unenforceable and uncollectible by operation of law. The court modified the judgment to vacate the restitution fine, affirmed the judgment as modified, and directed the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment.
Key Takeaways
- A trial court resentencing a defendant under Penal Code section 1172.75 may reimpose an upper term without the aggravating factors being stipulated to or found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury.
- Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) carves out an exception to the rule that ameliorative changes in the law must be applied at a section 1172.75 resentencing.
- Because section 1170, subdivision (b)'s factfinding requirements do not apply at a section 1172.75 resentencing, the Sixth Amendment is not implicated.
- The California Supreme Court has granted review in People v. Eaton, so the upper-term question remains unsettled.
- Section 1465.9, subdivision (d) mandates vacating restitution fines after 10 years, and a section 1172.75 resentencing does not restart the 10-year clock.
Why It Matters
The decision reaffirms the Third District's holding in Brannon-Thompson that trial courts may reimpose upper terms at section 1172.75 resentencings without the Sixth Amendment jury-trial requirements that section 1170, subdivision (b) would otherwise impose, while acknowledging that the Supreme Court's pending review in Eaton signals the law remains unsettled.
It also provides guidance on restitution fines: section 1465.9's 10-year enforcement limit applies even when a defendant is resentenced under section 1172.75, so defendants originally sentenced more than 10 years earlier may have those fines vacated even when the rest of the sentence is affirmed.
Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket