Background
Five individual plaintiffs—Pedro Vasquez Perdomo, Carlos Alexander Osorto, Isaac Villegas Molina, Jorge Hernandez Viramontes, and Jason Brian Gavidia—and three organizations—Los Angeles Worker Center Network, United Farm Workers, and Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights—challenged what they called a Racially Based Stops Policy in Los Angeles-area immigration enforcement. They alleged that federal agents selected people for detentive stops because they appeared Latino, or Latino and working class, rather than through a pre-stop, individualized assessment of reasonable suspicion. Their operative Second Amended Complaint, filed April 9, 2026, asserted Fourth Amendment unreasonable-seizure and Fifth Amendment equal-protection theories and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, fees, and costs. Defendants denied that the policy existed and denied conducting unconstitutional stops.
The Stop/Arrest Plaintiffs moved for class certification on August 4, 2026, proposing a Suspicionless Stops Class and a First Discriminatory Treatment Class covering specified detentive stops since June 6, 2025. The court heard the motion alongside a preliminary-injunction request on September 24, 2026, accepted supplemental briefing, and incorporated factual findings from the concurrently issued preliminary-injunction order. This amended public order followed an originally sealed order and the parties' submissions about redactions; the court concluded that no redactions were needed.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong granted the motion in part and certified both classes under Rule 23(b)(2). The court found Article III standing for the individual plaintiffs based on past detentions, continued exposure through ordinary work and job-seeking activities, and evidence of an ongoing officially sanctioned practice, applying Lyons, Melendres, and the Ninth Circuit's Vasquez Perdomo decision. It also held that the organizations could represent affected members in their associational capacity, independently satisfied the associational-standing requirements, and rejected the argument that organizations are categorically barred from serving as class representatives.
On the Rule 23(a) factors, the court found numerosity supported by fifty-five individual accounts and evidence of multi-person operations, without requiring an exact class count. Common questions concerned whether the challenged selection practices existed and whether they were constitutional, rather than the legality of every completed encounter, consistent with Gonzalez. Typicality and adequacy were satisfied despite differences in citizenship, encounter details, and an asserted flight defense, and the court found Rule 23(b)(2) satisfied because a single prospective remedy could govern each challenged method. It declined to add administrative-feasibility, cohesion, or predominance requirements beyond the Rule's text.
The First Discriminatory Treatment Class covers qualifying detentive stops in the district made at least partly because of apparent Latino race, color, or ethnicity, with border-related and specified known-target exceptions. The Suspicionless Stops Class was modified to cover immigration-enforcement stops based on apparent status as both low-income or working-class and Latino; removing the original requirement that the stop lack an individualized reasonable-suspicion assessment prevented membership from automatically proving a Fourth Amendment violation, curing the fail-safe defect under Olean. The order appointed the five individuals and three organizations as representatives and eight organizations and firms as class counsel for the First Discriminatory Treatment Class. It expressly did not decide the availability or terms of preliminary or final injunctive relief, individual removability, damages, or the validity of every completed stop.
Key Takeaways
- Both classes were certified for prospective relief, but the Suspicionless Stops Class was certified only with a modified definition that removed the fail-safe language.
- The court treated the existence and legality of the alleged selection methods as common questions suitable for classwide resolution.
- Differences in immigration status did not exclude citizens or noncitizens from challenging the same stop-selection practices.
- The modified class definition allows Defendants to contest liability without unsuccessful claimants automatically falling outside the class.
- Certification did not itself award an injunction or decide individual damages, suppression, release, removal, or the lawfulness of every completed stop.
Why It Matters
The order allows common litigation of alleged immigration-stop selection practices affecting people beyond the named plaintiffs, including future members who are actually subjected to the defined conduct. Its fail-safe analysis is especially important: describing the challenged demographic criteria is permissible, but defining membership so that it necessarily establishes a constitutional violation is not.
The decision also separates certification from final relief. The court emphasized that any later judgment or injunction must address injuries actually established, and it identified summary judgment as an appropriate stage for addressing unnamed members' standing under the Ninth Circuit's guidance in Olean and Healy.
Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket