Background
Mohammed Akram Arain appealed the decision of HHJ Saggerson, dated 24 September 2025, dismissing his claim for false imprisonment following a two-day trial on the preliminary issue of liability. Mr Justice Ritchie heard the appeal on 16 October 2026 in the High Court, King’s Bench Division, with Mr Zainul Jafferji appearing for the appellant and Matthew Howarth, instructed by the Government Legal Department, for the respondent. Permission to appeal had been granted on five of seven grounds; grounds 6 and 7 were refused and not renewed.
The claim concerned 50 days of immigration detention between 21 November 2016 and 9 January 2017. Arain, a Pakistani national, had lawfully entered the United Kingdom in July 2013, married a British citizen and had children born in 2014 and 2015. His applications for leave to remain were refused, including because of fraud connected with his English Language Test. After an unsuccessful judicial review challenge, he pursued an appeal to the Court of Appeal against the refusal of permission. Home Office records showed that, when detained, he reported an outstanding appeal; officers checked the position and treated an appeal against refusal of permission for judicial review as no barrier to removal. His solicitors subsequently supplied appeal information, and detention reviews continued to consider the issue.
Arain obtained an injunction from Beatson LJ on 22 December 2016 preventing removal. The Secretary of State decided to release him 15 days later, with release taking effect after a further three days. His particulars of claim alleged failures properly to consider the pending appeal, family life and alternatives to detention, and unlawful maintenance of detention after the injunction. A further pleaded particular was not pursued at trial.
The Court’s Holding
Ritchie J dismissed every ground of appeal. He held that the trial judge had considered and determined each pleaded allegation, had not reversed the burden of proof, and had decided the case on the pleaded claim and defences. Although the Secretary of State bore the burden of proving that detention was lawful, the claimant remained responsible for properly pleading the facts and matters relied upon. For allegations based on breaches of Home Office regulations, rules, guidance or policies, the court said the claimant should identify the relevant provision and alleged breach with particularity, re-particularising after disclosure where necessary. It was unworkable and unfair for a claimant merely to plead imprisonment and require the Home Office to prove lawfulness without identifying the factual criticisms.
On the evidence, there was sufficient material to support the findings that officials considered Arain’s appeal when detaining him and during subsequent reviews, despite some confusion in the records and concessions by the Secretary of State’s witness, Liam Lynch, who had not made the relevant decisions. Consistently with Pharis, the appeal against refusal of permission for judicial review was not itself a barrier to removal and did not create an automatic stay. The documents also supported findings that family circumstances and alternatives to detention were considered. The judge’s conclusion that detention until 23 December 2016 was reasonable, and that the roughly two-week delay before the release decision following the injunction was reasonable, fell within the ambit open to a reasonable judge. The post-injunction assessment included the Christmas and New Year period and inquiries about whether the appeal would be expedited.
The court rejected the complaint that liability had been established on an unpleaded defence. It also rejected the late allegation that section 13 of the Judicial Review guidance required consultation with the Operational Support and Certification Unit: that allegation had not been pleaded, first appeared in a skeleton argument the day before trial, and was never added by amendment. The general challenge to the assessment of evidence identified no overlooked or incorrectly assessed document and did not meet the stringent standard for overturning trial findings. The policies ground likewise failed because it did not identify the relevant policy or paragraph and ultimately repeated the unpleaded OSCU allegation.
Separately, Ritchie J refused an oral application made at the start of the appeal hearing to admit an email and the entire trial bundle. No application notice or supporting witness statement had been filed or served, and the explanation was that the appellant’s lawyer had not thought to apply earlier. The judge held that last-minute verbal applications require exceptionally sound justification, which was absent.
Key Takeaways
- All five permitted grounds of appeal were dismissed, leaving the dismissal of the false imprisonment claim intact.
- The defendant’s burden to prove lawful detention does not eliminate the claimant’s obligation to plead the factual basis and particularise alleged policy or guidance breaches.
- The appeal was a review under CPR rule 52.21, not a rehearing; challenges to trial findings faced the high “plainly wrong” or rationally insupportable threshold.
- The reasonableness rulings were specific to the pleaded allegations and evidence, including the post-injunction delay and consideration of expedition.
Why It Matters
The judgment distinguishes pleading obligations from the burden of proof in immigration false imprisonment claims. It emphasises that claimants must identify the issues and relevant policy provisions so that evidence and disclosure can address them, while the Secretary of State must still justify the lawfulness of detention on the pleaded case.
It also illustrates the appellate court’s reluctance to revisit multifactorial detention findings and credibility assessments without a serious error. The fresh-evidence ruling was tied to the application’s procedural defects and lack of justification, rather than announcing a universal bar to late evidence.