Background
Seyedmahmood Kia, an Iranian citizen accepted into a Mechanical Engineering PhD program at the University of Alberta, submitted a study permit application to Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) in December 2023. By the time the matter came before the Federal Court more than two and a half years later, no decision had been rendered. Kia had deferred his doctoral program three times and received a final deferral notice, placing his academic future in jeopardy. Frustrated by the silence, he filed access-to-information requests and ultimately sought judicial review, asking the Court to issue an order of mandamus compelling IRCC to make a decision.
The only evidence the Respondent placed before the Court consisted of two clerical affidavits: one attaching Global Case Management System (GCMS) notes ending in May 2025, and another documenting a request for information sent to Kia in April 2025 indicating that security screening was then in progress. No affidavit was filed in response to the leave grant, despite the Court providing IRCC until April 21, 2026 to do so. Counsel for the Respondent argued in written submissions that security screening explained the delay and that the Federal Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Benison v Canada (RCMP External Review Committee), 2026 FCA 53, had “limited relevance” because immigration processing levels were set by target categories.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Battista granted the application and issued an order of mandamus, directing IRCC to render a decision on Kia’s study permit application within 30 days. Applying the eight-part test from Apotex v Canada (Attorney General) (1993) as interpreted by Benison, the Court found all criteria satisfied. On the critical third branch — whether Kia had a clear right to performance of the duty — the Court applied the Conille framework and concluded that the delay of over two and a half years was prima facie unreasonable, greatly exceeding both the 60-day service standard in place when the application was filed and the later 41-week dynamic processing benchmark. The statutory objectives of IRPA, which include facilitating student entry and ensuring prompt processing, further supported this finding.
Once Kia demonstrated unreasonable delay, the onus shifted to the Respondent to justify it. The Court held that justification must be introduced by affidavit evidence, not through counsel’s written submissions alone. Because the GCMS evidence was more than a year old and no updated affidavit was filed, the Court declined to accept that ongoing security screening — rather than misallocation or inefficient use of resources — explained the continuing delay. The Respondent’s argument that Benison was inapplicable was rejected; the Court, consistent with several sister decisions, treated Benison as binding appellate authority applicable to all mandamus applications, with no carve-out for immigration-level targeting or cases where some explanation had been offered.
The Court also addressed costs. While a bare mandamus finding does not attract costs, Justice Battista found “special reasons” under Rule 22 of the Federal Courts Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules: IRCC had repeatedly ignored the applicant’s requests for information, forcing him to pursue access-to-information proceedings and this litigation merely to understand why his application was stalled. The Respondent’s attempt to persuade the Court to disregard binding appellate authority further supported the award. The Court awarded costs of $1,000 (rather than the $10,000 solicitor-and-client amount sought, which lacked evidentiary support).
Key Takeaways
- Benison (2026 FCA 53) is binding on all Federal Court mandamus applications and cannot be sidestepped on the basis that immigration processing levels are set by target categories or that some explanation for delay has been offered.
- A respondent’s justification for administrative delay must be introduced by sworn affidavit evidence; counsel’s written submissions cannot substitute for evidence, and stale GCMS notes from over a year earlier will not suffice to discharge the burden.
- Security screening, while an inherent part of processing study permit applications, is best addressed as a justification under the third prong of the Conille test rather than used to inflate the baseline time the process inherently requires.
- Special reasons for costs in mandamus cases can be grounded in a respondent’s persistent failure to respond to an applicant’s inquiries and in counsel’s attempt to have the Court ignore recent binding appellate authority.
Why It Matters
This decision is one of a growing line of Federal Court rulings applying Benison to compel IRCC to act on long-delayed study permit applications from Iranian nationals, who commonly face extended security screening. By firmly rejecting IRCC’s attempts to distinguish or limit Benison, Justice Battista reinforces that structural arguments about immigration-level targets cannot insulate the government from judicial oversight of unreasonable delay. The decision also clarifies how the reasonableness standard under Vavilov maps onto the mandamus framework, treating inordinate delay as a species of administrative unreasonableness rather than a purely remedial question.
For immigration practitioners, the case offers a practical reminder that affidavit evidence is essential when the government seeks to justify processing delays — and that failure to file updated evidence after leave is granted risks an uncontested mandamus order. The $1,000 costs award, grounded partly on litigation misconduct, signals that courts may increasingly look unfavorably on respondents who press arguments already foreclosed by appellate authority.