Background
Corinne Pereira was terminated by Horizon North Camp & Catering Inc. in September 2020. Her union, UNITE HERE Local 40, pursued and settled two grievances on her behalf, with the settlements resolving all claims arising from her employment. Dissatisfied with the settlements, Pereira filed duty-of-fair-representation complaints under the Labour Relations Code against the union, alleging it had breached its obligations in settling her grievances. Both complaints were dismissed by Associate Chair Glougie of the British Columbia Labour Relations Board, and reconsideration was denied by a Board panel.
Pereira sought judicial review of all four Board decisions. In 2022, the Supreme Court of British Columbia dismissed her petitions, the Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal in 2023, and the Supreme Court of Canada denied leave to appeal in December 2023. Undeterred, Pereira filed a new petition for judicial review in February 2025, alleging the original Board decisions had been obtained by fraud — including claims that Associate Chair Glougie had altered evidence, fabricated facts, and improperly acted as the union’s spokesperson.
A chambers judge struck the new petition on res judicata grounds, declared Pereira a vexatious litigant under s. 18 of the Supreme Court Act, and dismissed her application to disqualify him on bias grounds. Pereira appealed all three orders to the Court of Appeal, also challenging a Court of Appeal chambers judge’s refusal to order pre-appeal disclosure and applying to adduce fresh evidence related to a Freedom of Information request.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal, in reasons for the full panel, dismissed all appeals and review applications. On the bias issue, the court held that Pereira had not established a reasonable apprehension of bias or actual bias on the part of the chambers judge. The court reviewed each of Pereira’s twelve grounds individually and cumulatively, finding none — including the judge’s 24-year history with the Attorney General’s office, his social relationship with AGBC counsel, or his spouse’s employment as a legislative drafter — gave rise to disqualifying bias. The court affirmed that the correct standard is whether a fully informed, reasonable member of the public would conclude the decision-maker was more likely than not unable to decide fairly.
On the res judicata issue, the court upheld the striking of the new petition. Pereira had already raised fraud allegations against Associate Chair Glougie in her original petitions, which were fully litigated through the courts and exhausted to the Supreme Court of Canada. The court found she was not entitled to repackage her arguments in hopes of a different result. On the vexatious litigant declaration, the court found no reviewable error in the chambers judge’s analysis: the record disclosed six separate actions arising from the same underlying dispute, five of which were found vexatious as re-litigation, meritless, or brought for an improper purpose.
Pereira’s application to adduce fresh evidence — documents from a Freedom of Information request suggesting government retention of counsel opposing her in related proceedings — was dismissed for failing the Palmer test. The court held the FOI response established only the existence of unspecified records related to a law firm’s retainer and did not establish that the province had retained that counsel, meaning the evidence could not reasonably have affected the outcome below. The Court of Appeal chambers judge’s refusal to order pre-appeal disclosure was also upheld, as Pereira’s requests were founded on speculation and would improperly reverse the onus of proof.
Key Takeaways
- A judge’s prior employment with a government ministry and social relationship with counsel appearing for that ministry does not automatically create a reasonable apprehension of bias; the test requires a fully informed, reasonable observer to conclude partiality is more likely than not.
- The doctrine of res judicata — including cause of action estoppel — bars re-litigation of fraud allegations against a tribunal decision-maker where those allegations were raised or could have been raised in earlier proceedings that have been finally determined.
- A vexatious litigant declaration under s. 18 of the Supreme Court Act is available where a litigant has habitually, persistently, and without reasonable grounds instituted legal proceedings; courts may impose broad restrictions extending beyond the specific dispute at issue.
- Fresh evidence on appeal must satisfy the Palmer test; evidence that cannot reasonably be expected to have affected the outcome, even taken at its highest, will be excluded.
- Pre-appeal disclosure orders are discretionary and will be refused where requests are speculative and would effectively reverse the burden of proof onto respondents to disprove alleged misconduct.
Why It Matters
This decision illustrates the limits courts will impose on persistent re-litigation of resolved disputes through fraud repackaging strategies. It reinforces that once judicial review proceedings — including Board-level decisions, superior court petitions, appeals, and leave applications — have run their full course, the finality principle forecloses new proceedings premised on the same underlying allegations, even when framed as newly discovered fraud. The case is a practical illustration of both cause of action estoppel and the vexatious litigant regime operating together to protect the administration of justice.
The court’s careful treatment of the judicial bias issues — addressing each ground individually and cumulatively, affirming the use of the Canadian Judicial Council’s Ethical Principles for Judges as guidance, and confirming that a spouse’s unrelated government employment does not ordinarily disqualify a judge — provides useful guidance for self-represented and represented litigants challenging judicial recusal decisions in British Columbia and beyond.