Background
The five appellants are owners of structures in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) built without permits and without the approval of the Military Commander, in an area covered by the Building Prohibition Order (Ramallah District) (No. 2/80), 1981 (the “Order”). On February 17, 2026, the appellants received formal notices of “intention to demolish” the buildings under the Order. They initially petitioned the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice, but that petition was dismissed at the threshold for failure to exhaust administrative remedies — specifically, for not having first filed an objection against the demolition notices. The respondents agreed, as a matter of grace, to extend the deadline for filing such an objection, and the court noted that no position on the merits was being taken.
The appellants then filed an objection with the Military Commander. On March 17, 2026, the Military Commander rejected it. On April 10, 2026, the appellants turned to the Jerusalem District Court sitting as an Administrative Court. That court initially granted an interim injunction against demolition but, on May 19, 2026, dismissed the petition on the merits threshold, holding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. It extended the interim injunction until June 18, 2026, to allow the appellants time to pursue other remedies. This appeal followed, accompanied by a renewed application for an interim order.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court (Deputy President Sohlberg, joined by Justices Wilner and Ronen) dismissed the appeal summarily under Civil Procedure Regulation 138(a)(1), without calling for a response, finding no basis to disturb the lower court’s jurisdictional ruling. The court explained that Section 5A(a)(1) of the Administrative Courts Law, 5760-2000 grants the Jerusalem Administrative Court jurisdiction over administrative petitions “in matters of the Area” (i.e., Judea and Samaria) only when the challenged decision was made by an authority listed in the Fourth Schedule to that Law and concerns a matter enumerated in that Schedule — most relevantly, Item 2, which covers decisions under Section 38 of the Town, Village and Building Planning Law, No. 79 of 1966. The petition here was expressly directed at the Military Commander’s rejection of the appellants’ objection, a decision rooted in a military security order, not in the Town Planning Law.
The court further held that, even accepting for the appellants’ benefit that the decision may have been issued by an authority other than the Military Commander personally, it was plainly not issued under the Town Planning Law and therefore still fell outside the Fourth Schedule. Section 5A(c) of the Administrative Courts Law defines “security legislation” broadly to include any order, regulation, or notice issued by the IDF Commander in the Area, a Military Commander, or “any other authority acting pursuant to their authority, on their behalf, or with their approval.” Because the Order was issued under Military Order No. 393 (Supervision of Construction in Judea and Samaria) (later consolidated into Security Provisions Order No. 1651, 2009), all challenges to it — including the appellants’ ancillary argument that the Order had already lapsed or been revoked — fell outside the Administrative Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed together with the application for an interim injunction. No costs were awarded. The court did grant a 10-day temporary protective order commencing upon expiry of the lower court’s injunction (June 18, 2026) to afford the appellants minimal time to organize.
Key Takeaways
- The Jerusalem Administrative Court’s jurisdiction over West Bank matters is strictly cabined by Section 5A of the Administrative Courts Law and the Fourth Schedule: only decisions by listed bodies on listed subjects (chiefly decisions under the Town Planning Law) qualify; military-order-based demolition decisions do not.
- “Security legislation” under Section 5A(c) is defined broadly enough to capture decisions made not only by the IDF Commander or a Military Commander, but by any authority acting pursuant to their power, on their behalf, or with their approval — closing off the appellants’ argument that the deciding body was a civilian unit rather than the Commander himself.
- A collateral argument that an underlying security order has expired or been revoked does not convert the petition into one that escapes the jurisdictional carve-out; the Administrative Court still lacks power to adjudicate such claims.
- After exhausting available procedural extensions, landowners challenging West Bank military demolition orders must seek relief in the High Court of Justice (Supreme Court sitting as HCJ), not the Administrative Court.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the strict two-track jurisdictional architecture that governs Israeli court review of administrative action in the West Bank. The Administrative Court in Jerusalem handles a defined category of Area-related decisions — essentially those rooted in civil planning law — while all challenges to security legislation and to actions taken under military authority remain within the exclusive purview of the High Court of Justice. Practitioners must carefully identify the legal source of the challenged decision before choosing a forum; a wrong choice, even one made in good faith, results in threshold dismissal with no merits review.
The ruling also illustrates the procedural hazards facing West Bank landowners facing imminent demolition. The appellants were required to exhaust an administrative objection process before any court would entertain their claims, and when they then chose the wrong court, months of proceedings elapsed without a merits ruling. The Supreme Court’s brief 10-day grace order, while practically modest, signals some residual solicitude for orderly transition, but the overall message is that forum selection errors in this area of law carry severe practical consequences.