Background
The parties were former neighbors embroiled in a dispute over an easement for ingress and egress to a shared driveway. In January 2022, plaintiff James Jerome, Jr. sued defendants Kerry Raheb and Renee Houston in the Bennington Unit Civil Division, alleging that defendants blocked driveway access to him and his invitees. His complaint asserted claims of nuisance, intentional interference with prospective business relationships, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Throughout the litigation, defendants filed repeated motions — seeking dismissal and the recusal of two judges, opposing counsel, and a mediator — and refused to participate in discovery, which prevented mediation from proceeding. In September 2024, the court granted plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on all three counts. A damages hearing was held in July 2025; defendants, despite having received notice, neither appeared nor sought a continuance. The court entered final judgment based on the evidence presented at that hearing.
In August 2025, defendants moved to vacate the judgment under Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) and 60(b)(6), alleging fraud. They claimed plaintiff did not actually hold the easement and had engaged in misconduct, and they attributed their absence from the damages hearing to a family member’s death. The civil division denied the motion, and defendants appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the civil division’s denial of defendants’ Rule 60(b) motion in its entirety. The court held that defendants failed to establish fraud by clear and convincing evidence as required under Rule 60(b)(3), and that their allegations fell far short of the “most egregious misconduct” standard necessary to support a claim of fraud on the court under Rule 60(b)(6). The court found no abuse of discretion in any of the civil division’s rulings.
On excusable neglect, the court upheld the civil division’s finding that defendants’ proffered explanation — a family member’s death — was not raised until an August 22, 2025 reply memorandum, more than six weeks after the July 7, 2025 hearing, and was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Defendants had full notice of the hearing and took no steps to continue it or alert the court of their unavailability. On the judicial bias claim, the court reiterated that adverse rulings do not, standing alone, constitute evidence of bias, and noted that defendants’ recusal motion was properly denied for failure to comply with procedural requirements, including the absence of a supporting affidavit.
The court also rejected defendants’ challenge to the underlying summary judgment, holding it was not properly preserved for appeal because defendants never appealed the original judgment, and in any event a hearing is not required before a court decides summary judgment under Vermont law. Claims not raised as counterclaims or defenses during the litigation were deemed waived and could not be introduced through a Rule 60(b) motion.
Key Takeaways
- A Rule 60(b)(3) fraud claim requires clear and convincing evidence; general accusations unsupported by specific factual showings will not suffice.
- Rule 60(b)(6) fraud on the court is an extremely high bar, reserved for unconscionable and calculated schemes to improperly influence the court — not ordinary litigation disputes.
- A party who receives notice of a hearing and neither appears nor seeks a continuance cannot later use a Rule 60(b) motion to relitigate issues decided at that hearing.
- Adverse trial court rulings alone do not establish judicial bias, and a recusal motion that lacks the required supporting affidavit is properly denied.
- Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for a timely appeal and may not be used to raise arguments — including challenges to summary judgment — that were available but not pursued on direct appeal.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the high evidentiary threshold for setting aside a final judgment on fraud grounds and underscores that Rule 60(b) is a narrow remedy, not a second chance for parties who made deliberate litigation choices — such as boycotting discovery, skipping hearings, and foregoing counterclaims. For practitioners, it serves as a reminder that procedural defaults and strategic decisions made during the litigation cannot easily be undone post-judgment.
Although this is an unpublished three-justice panel order carrying no precedential weight under Vermont’s rules, it illustrates how Vermont courts apply established standards from cases like Godin v. Godin and Riehle v. Tudhope to reject post-judgment motions that amount to relitigation by another name. Attorneys advising clients in contentious neighbor or property disputes should take note of the court’s firm treatment of obstructive litigation conduct and the consequences of disengaging from the process.