Background
Jenna Amacher was elected in August 2020 to a three-year term as an alderman on the Tullahoma, Tennessee City Council. She was a polarizing figure—opposing a popular local redevelopment project, aligning with conservative positions, and posting a controversial Confederate-flag photo on Facebook. In February 2021, she sold her Tullahoma home and moved outside the city limits, while continuing to serve on the council. The City’s charter required aldermen to reside within the city and provided that moving outside vacated the office. Although Amacher eventually purchased an unimproved lot in the city and began planning construction of a new home, she did not begin sustained construction until early 2023 and lived outside the city for at least two years.
In October 2022, the local district attorney filed a quo warranto petition in Tennessee state court seeking Amacher’s removal from office based on her failure to maintain residency within the city. Two residents—Scott Van Velsor, who had collected 270 signatures requesting the inquiry, and Jim Woodard, who posted a bond as guarantor—were named in the petition. The state court ultimately denied the petition, finding that Amacher had done “just enough” to manifest an intent to return to the city, though it found her credibility on the residency question “damaged” by her evasive and dubious claims.
Following her state court victory, Amacher filed suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City, Mayor Ray Knowis, City Administrator Jennifer Moody, Van Velsor, and Woodard, alleging First Amendment retaliation and conspiracy to retaliate based on her protected speech. She also asserted a state law malicious prosecution claim against the individual defendants. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants, and Amacher appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Sixth Circuit, in an opinion by Chief Judge Sutton joined by Judges Larsen and Murphy, affirmed. The court held that a First Amendment retaliation claim premised on an allegedly retaliatory quo warranto petition requires the plaintiff to prove the absence of probable cause as an element of the claim. Drawing on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hartman v. Moore (2006) and Nieves v. Bartlett (2019), the court analogized the quo warranto action to the common law tort of malicious prosecution—and, secondarily, to the tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings—both of which require a plaintiff to disprove probable cause. The court reasoned that this requirement is especially apt where, as here, the allegedly retaliatory action was initiated through an independent third party (the district attorney) whose own role in approving the petition provided a layer of institutional screening.
Applying that standard, the court held that probable cause plainly supported the quo warranto petition. Amacher had sold her only home in the city, lived outside its limits for at least two years, owned no city property for six months, took over a year and a half to begin meaningful construction after buying a vacant lot, and made evasive and implausible claims about sleeping on an unimproved lot. The state court itself characterized the residency question as a close call and found her credibility undermined. That record was more than sufficient to establish a “probability or substantial chance” that the Tennessee court would have found Amacher ineligible—which is all probable cause requires.
The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of Amacher’s motion to extend the discovery deadline, finding no abuse of discretion. Amacher had 14 months to complete discovery, obtained a mid-case extension, and by her own admission was not “maximally diligent” in pursuing documents or depositions. Her last-minute motion to compel—filed two weeks before the already-extended deadline—did not establish good cause to delay the case further.
Key Takeaways
- A First Amendment retaliation claim based on an allegedly retaliatory quo warranto petition is most closely analogized to common law malicious prosecution, and therefore requires the plaintiff to prove the absence of probable cause as an element of the § 1983 claim.
- Probable cause is a low bar: it is satisfied if there was a “probability or substantial chance” that the underlying legal action could succeed—and the existence of a genuinely contested factual question (here, about residency intent) is enough to meet it.
- The no-probable-cause requirement protects citizens’ own First Amendment right to petition the courts to challenge whether an elected official meets the qualifications for office, preventing elected officials from using retaliation suits as a sword against political opponents.
- The court left open three issues for future cases: (1) whether an abuse-of-process theory might survive without disproving probable cause; (2) whether a selective-enforcement theory could avoid the probable-cause bar under Nieves; and (3) whether a successful quo warranto petition would even constitute an “adverse action” under First Amendment retaliation doctrine, given that legislators hold no personal right to legislative power.
- District courts have broad discretion to enforce discovery deadlines; a party who admits its own lack of diligence cannot establish good cause for a further extension.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the Sixth Circuit’s First Amendment retaliation framework for civil legal proceedings directed at public officials. By extending the probable-cause requirement from the criminal prosecution and arrest contexts (Hartman, Nieves) to quo warranto petitions, the court makes it significantly harder for elected officials to convert post-litigation grievances into federal civil rights claims against citizens and rival officials who challenged their eligibility for office. The ruling draws a sharp line between protected use of the courts to question an officeholder’s qualifications and actionable retaliation—and it reaffirms that the First Amendment’s protection of the right to petition operates in both directions.
The opinion also carries practical significance for municipal officials, residents, and their counsel in any jurisdiction where residency or eligibility disputes arise. So long as the underlying challenge rests on a legitimate factual question—even one ultimately resolved in the officeholder’s favor—the challenger is insulated from federal retaliation liability. Chief Judge Sutton’s pointed observation that Amacher, an elected official, was attempting to use the First Amendment as a “sword” against citizen-petitioners signals the panel’s concern about chilling legitimate civic participation in officeholder accountability.