Background
Adekunle Vincent Alaba and three family members from Nigeria applied for work and study permits under Canada’s Start-Up Visa (SUV) program, a pathway to permanent residency that allows applicants to work while their PR application is pending. When their permits approached expiration, they applied for extensions; those applications were refused by Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) for failure to submit required documentation.
Following the refusal, the applicants’ consultant advised them to apply for restoration of status rather than seek judicial review. The restoration applications for Mr. Alaba, his spouse, and two of three children were also denied for the same reason—missing documentation. Upon retaining new counsel, the applicants filed applications for leave and judicial review of both decisions in March 2025. Critically, during the pendency of the judicial review, IRCC rejected Mr. Alaba’s underlying permanent residency application in September 2025.
The Federal Court consolidated the two judicial review files for determination. The central issue was whether the court could remedy the extension and restoration refusals when the applicant no longer had a pending PR application—a fundamental requirement under the SUV program guidelines.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Janet M. Fuhrer held that the judicial review application was moot and dismissed it without considering the merits. The court admitted evidence of the PR refusal letter (which postdated the decisions under review) as background information relevant to the mootness analysis. The court found that the rejection of the PR application eliminated any “live controversy” between the parties because the SUV program eligibility guidelines mandate that applicants must have a “pending permanent resident application in the start-up business class.” Without a pending PR application, even a successful judicial review ordering redetermination of the extension and restoration decisions would have no practical effect—the applicants could not obtain renewed work permits.
The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot case on the merits under the test in *Borowski v. Canada*. While acknowledging a dispute existed regarding the reasonableness of the decisions and procedural fairness claims, the court found no compelling reason to proceed. A decision would not affect the applicants’ rights under the SUV program, the issues did not serve the public interest, the matter was not brief or recurring, and the applicants’ underlying arguments were not strong enough to justify judicial consideration of a hypothetical question.
Key Takeaways
- The SUV program’s eligibility requirement of a pending PR application is fundamental to work permit extensions and restorations—loss of the pending status renders extensions and restorations impossible.
- Subsequent events (here, rejection of a PR application) can transform an otherwise reviewable administrative decision into a moot case where the remedy sought is no longer available.
- Evidence not before the original decision-maker may be admissible on judicial review to establish mootness, even if not relevant to the merits of the challenged decision.
- Courts will not exercise discretion to hear moot matters unless there is a live controversy with practical effect, or compelling public interest, or the issue is brief and recurring—none of which applied here.
Why It Matters
This decision is significant for applicants and counsel relying on the SUV program. It demonstrates that judicial review of extension and restoration refusals may become academic if the underlying PR application is rejected, making the choice to challenge extension/restoration decisions (rather than the PR denial itself) a high-risk strategy. The decision underscores the importance of addressing the fundamental PR eligibility question before pursuing remedies for ancillary permit issues.
For practitioners advising SUV applicants, the case illustrates how the institutional context of the program—specifically the requirement of a pending PR application—constrains the remedial scope of judicial review. The decision also clarifies that mootness can arise even where the applicant challenges the reasonableness of a specific administrative decision, and that courts will apply the mootness doctrine to prevent wasteful adjudication of hypothetical rights. The case reinforces judicial economy principles while highlighting the cascading consequences when a foundational eligibility requirement is lost.