Background
Edward Hegner died intestate in November 2016. Colin Lateano, then 25, sued the estate claiming entitlement to a portion of Hegner’s assets through equitable adoption—an equitable doctrine allowing non-adopted children to inherit if they were raised as natural children and the decedent intended to adopt them. Colin demanded a jury trial, but the trial court struck his jury demand and later barred much of his testimony under the Dead-Man’s Act, a statute that prevents adverse parties from testifying about conversations with the deceased. After trial, the court ruled against Colin, and he appealed.
The facts showed that Colin’s biological father was not Hegner. Hegner began dating Colin’s mother, Shirley, while she was pregnant, and became deeply involved in Colin’s upbringing—coaching his sports, paying for his education, and playing a fatherly role throughout childhood and into college. However, Hegner maintained a separate residence in Palos, was never listed on official documents as Colin’s father, never legally adopted Colin, and told his close friends that Colin was not his son. Colin believed Hegner was his biological father until after Hegner’s death.
The trial court found that while Hegner loved Colin deeply and was a “father figure,” he did not intend to adopt Colin nor hold himself out as his son to the community at large, only within Shirley’s “orbit.” The court applied the “clear, unequivocal and convincing” standard required in equitable adoption cases and ruled in favor of the estate.
The Court’s Holding
The appellate court affirmed the judgment in all respects. First, the court held that Colin had no constitutional right to a jury trial. Illinois law provides jury trial rights only for actions where such rights existed under English common law when the state constitution was adopted. Since equity cases never had jury trial rights at common law, equitable adoption claims—which the court reaffirmed are equitable remedies, not legal claims—carry no constitutional jury trial right. The court rejected Colin’s argument that equitable adoption should be treated as a contract-to-adopt claim, finding that the Illinois Supreme Court had deliberately distinguished the two in DeHart v. DeHart (2013 IL 114137).
Second, the court held that the Dead-Man’s Act properly barred Colin from testifying about his conversations and interactions with Hegner. The statute prevents adverse parties from testifying about communications with the deceased, with limited exceptions—including one for testimony “relating to the heirship of a decedent.” The court found this exception inapplicable because equitable adoption does not alter heirship status; it merely permits a non-heir to receive a distribution based on equity. Unlike a woman testifying that she married the decedent (which would establish heirship), Colin’s testimony would establish only an equitable entitlement, not a change in legal status. The court acknowledged the harshness of this result but declined to rewrite the statute, noting that the Legislature could amend the law if it chose.
On the merits, the court affirmed the trial court’s factual findings that Colin failed to prove by “clear, unequivocal and convincing” evidence that Hegner intended to adopt him or held him out as his son to the community. The evidence showed Hegner’s private conduct was consistent with adoption, but his public conduct was not.
Key Takeaways
- Equitable adoption claims are equitable remedies, not legal claims, and therefore carry no constitutional right to a jury trial in Illinois.
- The Dead-Man’s Act exception for testimony “relating to the heirship of a decedent” does not apply to equitable adoption claims, since equitable adoption establishes only a right to a distribution, not a change in heirship status.
- Equitable adoption in Illinois requires proof by “clear, unequivocal and convincing” evidence that the decedent intended to adopt the plaintiff and held them out as their child to the community at large, not merely within a family circle.
- Courts cannot rewrite or amend statutes to reach a preferred outcome; if the Legislature wishes to protect equitable adoption claimants from the Dead-Man’s Act, it must amend the statute itself.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies important procedural and substantive limitations on equitable adoption claims in Illinois probate practice. Practitioners should understand that equitable adoption claimants face a high evidentiary bar (clear and convincing proof) and will encounter significant practical barriers to presenting their case, particularly the inability to testify about their own interactions with the deceased. The case also establishes that equitable adoption, while protecting against harsh applications of intestacy law, does not confer the full legal status of a child—a distinction with important procedural consequences.
The decision underscores that Illinois courts will not expand jury trial rights beyond their historical common-law scope, even in sympathetic cases. Litigants seeking to change these rules must petition the Legislature rather than expect judicial relief. For estate planners, the decision reinforces the importance of explicit adoption or clear testamentary provisions for stepchildren or children raised as one’s own, since informal family arrangements—no matter how loving—may not suffice for equitable adoption without proof of a public holding-out to the community.