Background
Alan and Laura Kaufman, self-represented plaintiffs, sued Natalie Jarnstedt for defamation and civil conspiracy arising from a letter Jarnstedt sent to Darien Animal Control in 2017. Jarnstedt, acting at the request of Kathleen Synnott, complained that the Kaufmans’ English Springer Spaniel dogs lacked proper shelter in extreme weather, adequate water, and food—allegations the court found partially false, as Jarnstedt had never personally observed the dogs or property. The Kaufmans sought $2.75 million in damages.
Jarnstedt filed a special motion to dismiss under Connecticut’s anti-SLAPP statute (§ 52-196a), claiming her letter constituted protected petitioning activity on a matter of public concern. The trial court granted the motion in May 2021 and subsequently awarded Jarnstedt $94,505.27 in attorney’s fees and litigation costs. The Kaufmans appealed twice, challenging both the dismissal and the fee award, and raising constitutional objections to the anti-SLAPP statute itself.
The Court’s Holding
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decisions on all grounds. On the jurisdiction question raised for the first time at oral argument, the court distinguished between subject matter jurisdiction (the court’s power to hear and determine a class of cases) and the court’s authority to exercise jurisdiction correctly. The trial court had clear subject matter jurisdiction over anti-SLAPP motions; the plaintiff merely challenged how that authority was exercised, not whether it existed. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that false statements stripped the defendant’s letter of constitutional protection, reaffirming the two-prong anti-SLAPP test: first, whether the defendant exercised protected free speech or petitioning rights on a matter of public concern (which it did), and second, whether the plaintiff demonstrated probable cause of prevailing on the merits (which he failed to do).
On the attorney’s fees dispute, the court rejected the plaintiff’s novel interpretation that “incurred” fees under § 52-196a (f)(1) required the defendant to personally pay them. The court held that “incurred” refers to the legal work performed in defense, not who ultimately bears the financial burden. Because Jarnstedt unquestionably incurred costs in defending against the SLAPP suit, and her insurance company would not have paid absent those incurred costs, the statutory condition was satisfied. The court upheld the fee calculation as reasonable under the Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express factors, finding no abuse of discretion. The plaintiff’s constitutional challenges, raised belatedly in a post-hearing brief, were deemed waived for untimely assertion.
Key Takeaways
- Anti-SLAPP subject matter jurisdiction is not implicated by disputes over whether a defendant properly exercised protected rights; such objections challenge only the manner of exercising jurisdiction, not its existence.
- The statutory requirement that a defendant “incur” attorney’s fees is satisfied by the performance of the work itself, regardless of whether an insurance company ultimately pays the obligation.
- Even statements containing false elements may constitute protected petitioning activity when directed to government officials on matters of public concern, provided the plaintiff cannot establish probable cause of prevailing on the merits.
- Constitutional challenges to the anti-SLAPP statute that are not timely raised are waived and will not be considered on appeal.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces Connecticut’s anti-SLAPP statute as a powerful tool for defendants defending frivolous litigation. By clarifying that subject matter jurisdiction is distinct from the correctness of how a court exercises its jurisdiction, the court insulates anti-SLAPP dismissals from jurisdictional attack, even when a motion is raised late in the appeal. The holding also settles a potentially significant dispute over fee-shifting: by focusing on fees “incurred” rather than fees “paid,” the court ensures that defendants with liability insurance—a common situation—remain entitled to full recovery of their legal defense costs. This prevents plaintiffs from exploiting insurance arrangements to avoid fee liability, which would undermine the anti-SLAPP statute’s protective purpose.
The decision reaffirms that Connecticut’s anti-SLAPP framework properly balances free speech protection against meritless litigation, even where some statements prove inaccurate. Defendants who communicate with government officials about matters of legitimate public concern receive statutory protection unless plaintiffs can demonstrate probable cause of prevailing on the underlying claims. Plaintiffs who fail to raise constitutional objections when appropriate lose the right to do so later, adding finality to SLAPP dismissals and preventing serial appeals designed to drain defendants’ resources through continued litigation.