Background
Warren Averett Companies formerly operated a Mobile accounting office supervised by Phillip Rivers. After the firm decided in 2024 to close that office and move its personnel to Daphne, it fired Rivers. Rivers joined competitor BMSS at its Mobile office. Six other Warren Averett employees who had worked with Rivers later followed him to BMSS. Their employment agreements contained noncompetition and confidentiality restrictions, and several Warren Averett clients subsequently ended their relationships with that firm and hired BMSS.
The events produced two related lawsuits. Rivers and the other former employees sued Warren Averett in Mobile Circuit Court for a declaration that their restrictive covenants were void and unenforceable. That action remained pending. Warren Averett separately sued BMSS in Jefferson Circuit Court, asserting six counts of tortious interference with contractual relations and one count of tortious interference with business relations. It alleged that BMSS induced violations of the employment agreements and took Warren Averett's clients.
BMSS moved to transfer the Jefferson County action to Mobile County under Alabama's forum-non-conveniens statute, § 6-3-21.1. That provision requires transfer to another proper venue when either party-and-witness convenience or the interest of justice favors the new forum. The Jefferson Circuit Court denied the motion. BMSS then sought mandamus, the recognized method for immediate review of a venue ruling, and argued that Mobile was both a proper venue and the county with the dispute's meaningful factual and judicial connection.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court granted the petition and issued the writ. Mobile County was a proper venue under the corporate-defendant venue statute because a substantial part of BMSS's allegedly tortious conduct occurred there. BMSS hired the former employees to work in its Mobile office, and the conduct said to interfere with their restrictive covenants centered on that location. The client-interference allegations likewise involved customers in and around Mobile and work associated with BMSS's Mobile operation.
The interest-of-justice branch required transfer even though Warren Averett's chosen forum was otherwise proper and ordinarily deserved deference. The record showed no suit-related BMSS conduct in Jefferson County. BMSS's general business activity there did not create a meaningful nexus to the specific controversy. By contrast, the former employees had worked in Mobile for Warren Averett and now worked there for BMSS, many affected clients resided or maintained offices in Mobile County, and the alleged recruitment and interference occurred there. Requiring Jefferson County to adjudicate a dispute with little local connection would impose an unwarranted burden on that forum.
The parallel Mobile declaratory-judgment action reinforced the result. Both suits depend substantially on whether the former employees' restrictive covenants are enforceable. Keeping the cases in separate counties would risk repetitive proof, duplicated judicial effort, and inconsistent judgments. Transfer allows the Mobile Circuit Court to address the overlapping factual and legal questions in one forum. Because BMSS established a clear legal right under the interest-of-justice standard, the Court directed the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its denial and enter an order transferring the action to Mobile County.
Key Takeaways
- General business activity in a county does not outweigh the absence of suit-specific conduct there under the interest-of-justice analysis.
- For tortious-interference claims, the location of the defendant's alleged inducement, hiring, and client-related conduct can establish a substantial venue connection.
- Parallel litigation involving the same restrictive covenants favors transfer when consolidation in one forum reduces duplicated work and inconsistent outcomes.
Why It Matters
For Alabama commercial and employment litigators, the ruling shows that technically proper venue is only the first step. A transfer record should map each alleged act, employee, client, document, and related case to a county. A plaintiff relying on headquarters or generalized business contacts should be prepared to explain the chosen county's connection to the actual claims. A movant, meanwhile, gains substantial force by showing that another proper county contains both the operative conduct and a pending action addressing overlapping legal issues.
The mandamus posture also matters. Because an ordinary appeal does not adequately cure trial in the wrong venue, parties must assemble their venue evidence at the trial-court stage; the Supreme Court confines review to material properly presented there. Counsel handling restrictive-covenant and employee-mobility disputes should coordinate related filings early, assess whether one court can resolve common enforceability questions, and preserve a complete evidentiary record for immediate venue review.