Background
Cooper Trannie Gordon was convicted of second-degree murder for the October 2019 killing of his friend Terry Spencer in the Meadow Lakes area near Wasilla, Alaska. A hunter found Spencer’s body under a blue blanket with a gunshot wound to the forehead; autopsy evidence confirmed the wound was not self-inflicted and that Spencer had been shot from at least two feet away. Cell phone records, Google location data, and witness testimony placed Gordon with Spencer in the Meadow Lakes area on October 17, 2019, the day Spencer was last seen alive.
Following the shooting, Gordon took Spencer’s Jeep and firearms, lied to state troopers about knowing Spencer, and lent Spencer’s vehicle to his ex-girlfriend while telling her he acquired it by “doing a job.” He also searched the internet for gun shows and how to sell the stolen firearms—all before Spencer’s body was discovered. A friend testified that Gordon had said on the day of the shooting that Spencer “has been asking me to kill him for years.” Gordon was charged with first-degree murder, two counts of second-degree murder (under AS 11.41.110(a)(1), for causing death while intending serious physical injury or knowing death was substantially certain; and under AS 11.41.110(a)(2), for extreme indifference to human life), second-degree theft, and third-degree weapons misconduct as a felon in possession of a concealable firearm.
The jury acquitted Gordon of first-degree murder but convicted him on both theories of second-degree murder, as well as on the theft and weapons charges. The superior court merged the two murder verdicts and sentenced Gordon to 50 years on the murder conviction, plus consecutive 3-year terms for theft and weapons misconduct, for a composite sentence of 56 years to serve. Gordon appealed on two grounds, and the Department of Public Safety had also identified two clerical errors in the judgment that the superior court had not corrected.
The Court’s Holding
Affirmed in substance; remanded solely to correct two clerical errors in the judgment.
On the sufficiency challenge to the extreme indifference murder count, Gordon argued that without direct evidence of the exact circumstances of the shooting, the jury could not distinguish between ordinary recklessness (which supports only manslaughter) and the extreme recklessness required for second-degree murder under AS 11.41.110(a)(2). The Court of Appeals disagreed. Citing its prior decision in Neitzel v. State, 655 P.2d 325, 337 (Alaska App. 1982), the court held that “shooting at someone, by itself, is devoid of social utility and consequently has been used by commentators as the paradigm of extreme indifference to human life.” Combined with evidence of Gordon’s likely motive (stealing Spencer’s property), his post-crime conduct (hiding the body, driving away in Spencer’s Jeep, researching gun sales, and never alerting authorities), and the lack of any remorse, the circumstantial record was sufficient for a fair-minded juror to find extreme recklessness beyond a reasonable doubt. The court rejected the premise that an unknown sequence of events defeats an extreme indifference conviction, relying on Hinson v. State, 199 P.3d 1166 (Alaska App. 2008), where such a conviction was affirmed on purely circumstantial evidence.
On the inconsistent verdict claim, the court applied Alaska’s distinctive DeSacia v. State doctrine. Under DeSacia, 469 P.2d 369 (Alaska 1970), Alaska joined a minority of jurisdictions that will reverse a criminal conviction when the jury’s verdicts are factually inconsistent—and subsequent decisions have noted Alaska appears to be the sole remaining state to do so. But DeSacia limits relief to verdicts that are “necessarily inconsistent,” “irreconcilably in conflict,” and “irrational.” Gordon argued that if the jury rejected an intent to kill (first-degree murder), it could not rationally find he acted knowing death was substantially certain (second-degree murder under AS 11.41.110(a)(1)). The court disagreed: a rational jury could find Gordon lacked specific intent to kill while still concluding he knew a gunshot to the head was substantially certain to cause death or serious physical injury—these are different rungs on the culpability ladder. Because Gordon had not objected to the alleged inconsistency at the time the verdicts were read, plain error review applied, and the court held the verdicts were not so irreconcilably inconsistent as to satisfy that standard.
The remand addressed two clerical errors the Department of Public Safety had flagged but the superior court had not corrected: the judgment incorrectly recorded a conviction on the merged-out AS 11.41.110(a)(1) count, and it erroneously noted the first-degree murder acquittal as both “not guilty” and “dismissed.”
Key Takeaways
- A gunshot wound to the forehead is itself the paradigm of extreme indifference to human life under Alaska law; circumstantial evidence of motive and callous post-crime conduct can sustain an extreme indifference murder conviction under AS 11.41.110(a)(2) even when the precise circumstances of the shooting are not directly established.
- Alaska’s DeSacia doctrine—apparently the sole remaining U.S. rule requiring reversal for factually inconsistent verdicts—applies only when verdicts are necessarily and irreconcilably inconsistent; an acquittal on first-degree murder does not automatically render a conviction on a related lesser theory fatally inconsistent when a rational jury could have found the underlying mental states to be distinct.
- Defendants who fail to object contemporaneously to alleged verdict inconsistency must satisfy plain error review on appeal, not mere harmless-error review—a significantly higher bar.
- When the Department of Public Safety issues a notice of judgment error, the trial court must correct the judgment; unaddressed notices are themselves grounds for remand by the court of appeals.
Why It Matters
Gordon is significant on two fronts for Alaska criminal practitioners. For prosecutors, the decision confirms that the extreme indifference murder theory does not require reconstructing every detail of a killing. Where the overall pattern of evidence—motive, the nature of the fatal act, and post-crime conduct revealing callousness—points to extreme recklessness, courts will uphold a conviction over a sufficiency challenge. Defense counsel arguing that evidentiary gaps allow for a less culpable explanation face a high bar: on appeal, evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and credibility determinations are left entirely to the jury.
On the inconsistent-verdict issue, the decision is a useful practical reminder about Alaska’s unique DeSacia rule. While Alaska stands essentially alone in recognizing a remedy for factually inconsistent verdicts, that remedy has real limits: the inconsistency must be stark and unavoidable, not merely a logical tension the jury might have resolved differently. More importantly, the argument must be raised when the verdicts are announced—waiting until the appellate brief invokes plain error review and is unlikely to succeed absent a glaring conflict. Defense attorneys who obtain partial acquittals should be alert to any inconsistency with remaining convictions in real time, at the moment the foreperson reads the verdict.