Background
Dion Humphrey and his neighbors, attorney Robert Reges and Mala Reges, owned adjacent lots in Anchorage divided by an angled property line. After a 2023 survey suggested the Regeses’ retaining wall might encroach onto Humphrey’s lot by as little as two inches over 33 feet, Humphrey filed a pro se lawsuit for encroachment. The Regeses denied any encroachment and, alternatively, asserted adverse possession of any disputed strip, relying on their continuous use of the boundary area since 2007.
The case was contentious long before trial. Humphrey filed scores of procedurally defective motions, sought recusal of the judge twice, was sanctioned $25 for relitigating the denial of a jury trial, and refused to comply with discovery orders. When a multi-day trial finally convened in September 2024, Humphrey repeatedly interrupted opposing counsel and the court, made accusations of discrimination and bias, and ignored the judge’s instructions despite repeated warnings. The superior court escalated consequences step by step — verbal admonishment, transfer to videoconference participation, muting — before ejecting Humphrey from the proceedings entirely when his disruptive behavior continued even by video link. He refused, at one point, to turn off a blaring television during remote proceedings. The court allowed Humphrey to submit a written closing argument after his removal, and both parties filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The superior court adopted the Regeses’ proposed findings. It ruled the retaining wall lay entirely within Lot 38, and found that even if the 2023 survey identified a minimal two-inch overage near one corner, the Regeses had obtained title to that strip by adverse possession through their continuous, open, and notorious use of the boundary area from 2007 onward. The court awarded the Regeses $37,566.70 in attorney’s fees under Alaska Civil Rule 82 as the prevailing party after trial. Humphrey appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed on all grounds, resolving as a matter of first impression whether a trial court may remove a disruptive civil litigant from trial. Chief Justice Carney, writing for a unanimous court, held that such removal is reviewed for abuse of discretion — the same standard the Court applied to removal of criminal defendants in Douglas v. State, 214 P.3d 312 (Alaska 2009), which itself followed Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). Because the abuse-of-discretion standard applies even when the important constitutional rights of a criminal defendant are at stake, it applies with equal or greater force in civil litigation, where a self-represented plaintiff’s interest in remaining in the courtroom is constitutionally weaker.
The Court adopted the framework articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Kulas v. Flores, 255 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2001): before ejecting a civil litigant, the trial court must weigh the litigant’s interest in being present against the need for courtroom order and the opposing party’s right to a fair trial. A litigant waives the right to attend when, after adequate warnings about the consequences of continued disruption, the behavior does not improve. Applying that standard, the Court found no abuse of discretion. The superior court had given Humphrey repeated explanations of courtroom rules, a continuance to retain counsel, multiple explicit warnings, and two intermediate measures — videoconference and muting — before resorting to ejection. Critically, Humphrey retained the ability to submit written final argument after his removal and did so, undercutting any remaining due process concern about denial of a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
The Court separately held that Humphrey’s remaining appellate arguments — including challenges to the jury-trial ruling, evidentiary decisions, factual findings, and adverse-possession determination — were waived. His opening brief cited only two cases, a statute, and a constitutional provision without explaining their relevance, and offered no discernible legal theory in support of his claims. Although Alaska courts construe pro se briefs liberally under precedents such as Wright v. Anding, 390 P.3d 1162 (Alaska 2017), even self-represented litigants must do more than make cursory assertions. The attorney’s fee award under Civil Rule 82 was affirmed without extended analysis.
Key Takeaways
- As a matter of first impression, a trial court in Alaska may remove a disruptive self-represented civil litigant from trial without abusing its discretion, provided the court first employs escalating, less-drastic measures and gives adequate warnings before resorting to ejection.
- The governing standard is the Kulas v. Flores balancing test — the litigant’s interest in presence weighed against the need for courtroom order and the opposing party’s right to a fair trial — and the removal decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
- Failure to brief arguments with supporting legal authority in an opening brief constitutes waiver on appeal, even for pro se litigants; Alaska’s liberal construction of self-represented pleadings does not save entirely undeveloped arguments.
Why It Matters
This decision fills a significant gap in Alaska civil practice. Trial courts have long managed disruptive civil litigants on an ad hoc basis; Humphrey v. Reges gives judges a clear framework and an explicit standard of review. The step-by-step escalation model the Court endorses — explanation, warning, videoconference, ejection — also maps out what a constitutionally adequate record looks like, providing Alaska trial judges a practical checklist to follow before removing a litigant from the courtroom. Practitioners representing clients against disruptive opposing parties should document each warning and each intermediate measure in the record to support any eventual ejection order on appeal.
The Court’s waiver analysis carries equal weight for appellate practitioners. The opinion confirms that Alaska’s lenient treatment of pro se briefs does not extend to arguments that are legally incoherent or unsupported by any authority. Attorneys assisting clients with self-represented appeals — and trial judges reviewing appellate submissions in hybrid proceedings — should note that even the most generous reading of an opening brief cannot supply a legal theory the brief fails to articulate.