Background
In January 2020, John Leo Davis pleaded guilty to second-degree murder under A.R.S. § 13-1104(A)(1) and agreed to serve a 25-year prison sentence. The plea agreement expressly stated that the sentence was “day-for-day, calendar years, aka ‘flat time,'” and defined “calendar year” as 365 days of actual time served “without release, suspension or commutation of sentence, probation, pardon or parole, work furlough or release from confinement on any other basis.” Davis initialed those provisions, acknowledging his understanding and agreement.
In 2024, Davis submitted multiple applications for sentence commutation. The Arizona Department of Corrections Time Computation Unit (TCU) declined to process them, concluding that his calendar-year sentence was statutorily ineligible for commutation under A.R.S. §§ 13-1104, -710, and -105. Davis then petitioned the Maricopa County Superior Court for judicial review and a trial de novo by jury. The superior court treated the matter as a special action and upheld the TCU’s determination, finding that the statutory definition of “calendar year” unambiguously bars commutation. Davis timely appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that A.R.S. § 13-105(4) defines “calendar year” to mean 365 days of actual time served without commutation or any other form of early release, and that the legislature’s purpose in enacting that definition was precisely to make such sentences non-commutable. Because Davis was sentenced to 25 calendar years and his plea agreement reiterated that condition, the TCU correctly determined he was ineligible for commutation, and the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying special-action relief.
The court also rejected Davis’s argument that applying § 13-105(4) in this way creates an irreconcilable conflict with A.R.S. § 31-403, which addresses commutation procedures for persons convicted of murder. The court noted that second-degree murder convictions can be sentenced under different schemes — not all of which require calendar-year terms — so § 31-403 can operate harmoniously as to other defendants even if it does not apply to Davis. Finally, the court found no basis for a writ of mandamus because Davis identified no legal duty that the TCU or superior court was obligated to perform.
Key Takeaways
- A sentence expressed in “calendar years” under A.R.S. § 13-105(4) is categorically ineligible for commutation; the definition itself operates as the statutory bar.
- A plea agreement that incorporates the “calendar year” flat-time requirement reinforces ineligibility and signals the defendant’s knowing waiver of commutation rights at the time of sentencing.
- A.R.S. § 31-403’s commutation procedures for murder convictions do not create a universal right to seek commutation; the statute can coexist with calendar-year sentencing because not all § 13-1104 convictions require calendar-year terms.
- A writ of mandamus will not issue unless the petitioner identifies a specific legal duty the respondent was required — but failed — to perform.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that Arizona’s “flat time” sentencing scheme carries real and enforceable consequences: inmates serving calendar-year sentences have no administrative pathway to seek commutation, regardless of subsequent conduct or rehabilitation. Defense attorneys negotiating plea agreements involving second-degree murder charges should ensure clients fully understand that accepting a calendar-year term forecloses commutation as a matter of statutory definition, not merely prosecutorial discretion.
Although the decision is non-precedential under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 111(c), it illustrates how courts will harmonize overlapping sentencing and clemency statutes to give effect to the legislature’s express intent — and underscores that statutory text spelling out “no commutation” means precisely that.