Background
In 2010, attorney Raya Tahan and her firm Tahan Law Office PLLC represented Kalamata Three Brothers LLC in a real estate dispute that ended in a large judgment against the client. Kalamata subsequently alleged legal malpractice and filed suit in Maricopa County Superior Court in 2012. After multiple failed attempts at personal service — with the process server’s affidavit noting that residents appeared to be avoiding service — Kalamata obtained a court order permitting alternative service by certified mail to addresses produced by a State Bar of Arizona subpoena.
Appellants never responded to the complaint, the notice and application for entry of default, or the motion for default judgment. The superior court entered a default judgment against them in March 2013. Twelve years later, in April 2025, Tahan and her firm moved to vacate the judgment under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), arguing defective service and an excessive damages award. The superior court denied the motion in August 2025, and Appellants timely appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed on all grounds, reviewing de novo the question of whether the judgment was void under Rule 60(b)(4) and finding service fully proper. The court held that Kalamata’s multiple failed attempts at personal service were sufficient to demonstrate impracticability under Rule 4.1(k), and that the rule does not require a plaintiff to attempt contact by telephone, email, or social media before seeking authorization for alternative service. The single certified-mail notice addressed to both defendants at their shared address was deemed adequate notice of the default application, as elevating that formality over substance would have been reversible error.
On damages, the court held the judgment was not void under Rule 60(b)(4) because the relief granted — a specific money sum — was not different in kind from what the complaint demanded. Relying on Dairyland Insurance Co. v. Richards, 108 Ariz. 89 (1972), the court held that a complaint seeking damages “in an amount to be proven at trial” is a “sum indefinite in amount” that does not bar entry of a definite default judgment. Finally, the court rejected relief under Rule 60(b)(6), finding that the twelve-year delay in seeking to vacate the judgment — with no meritorious defense shown — was plainly unreasonable as a matter of record.
Key Takeaways
- Under Arizona Rule 4.1(k), alternative service requires only a showing of impracticability — meaning standard service would be “extremely difficult or inconvenient” — and does not require attempts by telephone, email, or social media before the court may authorize it.
- A single certified-mail notice of default application addressed to two defendants sharing the same address is adequate service when it bears both parties’ names; courts will not void a judgment on such a technical ground.
- A complaint demanding damages “in an amount to be proven at trial” is a “sum indefinite in amount” under Dairyland, so a default judgment awarding a specific dollar figure does not violate the Rule 54(d) prohibition on relief exceeding the pleadings.
- A twelve-year unexplained delay in moving to vacate a default judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), without a showing of a meritorious defense, fails the “reasonable time” requirement as a matter of law.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that defendants who ignore litigation — including service attempts, default notices, and entry of judgment — face an extremely high bar in seeking vacatur years later. The opinion clarifies that Arizona’s alternative-service rule does not impose a checklist of modern communication methods before impracticability is established, giving plaintiffs meaningful flexibility when defendants evade process.
For plaintiffs’ counsel, the decision also confirms that an indefinite damages demand in a complaint does not undermine a later default judgment for a specific sum, provided the relief is of the same kind. Defense practitioners should note that this is a non-precedential memorandum decision under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 111(c) and may be cited only as authorized by that rule.