Background
In October 2024, a truck driver was approached at a Phoenix-area gas station by a man who pointed a gun at him and demanded “all you got.” The victim and the assailant briefly struggled before the man fled. Responding officers canvassed the area and stopped Johnnie Buckles — a Black man in his 50s wearing a gray shirt with black sleeves, matching the victim’s description — near the scene. Buckles denied being at the gas station. Because a radio relay of the suspect description had incorrectly described a black shirt, officers initially released him. A CO2 gun matching the victim’s description was found roughly 100 feet away, and dash-cam footage from the victim’s truck led officers to correct the shirt description, prompting Buckles’s arrest at a nearby motel. DNA analysis later showed Buckles was approximately 260 quintillion times more likely than a random person to have contributed one of four DNA profiles found on the gun.
Buckles was charged with one count of attempted armed robbery under A.R.S. §§ 13-1001 and -1904 and tried in June 2025. The State presented the victim, investigating officers, forensic experts, and the dash-cam video. The victim described the assailant at trial but was not asked to make an in-court identification of Buckles.
During Officer Ryan’s testimony about the photo lineup, defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds. The trial court directed the State not to elicit testimony about a positive identification, but permitted the officer to describe showing the lineup and then explain what officers did next. Officer Ryan then testified that after showing the lineup, officers “located the individual that we used in the photo lineup.” The court sustained the defense objection, gave a curative instruction to disregard the statement, and denied Buckles’s subsequent motion for a mistrial. The jury convicted Buckles, and he was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment.
The Court’s Holding
The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, affirmed the conviction. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial motion, applying the standard abuse-of-discretion review applicable to denials of mistrial motions. The court rejected Buckles’s argument that a reduced standard of deference applied because the State’s conduct caused the evidentiary issue, distinguishing State v. Dickinson, which addresses appellate review of granted mistrials (not denied ones) in the prosecutorial-misconduct context.
The court identified three independent grounds for rejecting the mistrial claim. First, Officer Ryan’s statement described police conduct — going to locate Buckles after showing the lineup — rather than repeating any assertion by the victim, and words or conduct not intended as assertions are not hearsay. Second, even construed as an implicit assertion of identification, the statement fell squarely within Arizona Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) as a prior identification statement, because the victim testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination. Third, any assumed error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the brevity of the statement, the curative instruction, and the overwhelming independent evidence of guilt, including Buckles’s proximity to the scene, his match to the victim’s description, the dash-cam video, the nearby CO2 gun, and DNA linking him to that weapon.
Key Takeaways
- Denial of a mistrial is reviewed for abuse of discretion in Arizona regardless of whether prosecutorial conduct prompted the disputed testimony; the heightened “strictest scrutiny” standard from Dickinson applies only to appellate review of granted mistrials over a defendant’s objection.
- An officer’s testimony describing police action taken after a photo lineup (rather than repeating the victim’s words) is not hearsay; and even if construed as an implicit identification, Arizona Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) renders a prior identification non-hearsay when the identifying witness testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination.
- A brief, immediately-stricken statement accompanied by a curative instruction is unlikely to warrant a mistrial where the remaining evidence of guilt is overwhelming — courts presume jurors follow instructions to disregard.
- The opinion is non-precedential under Arizona Rule of the Supreme Court 111(c) and may be cited only as authorized by that rule.
Why It Matters
This decision offers a practical roadmap for Arizona prosecutors and defense counsel navigating the line between permissible testimony about investigative steps and impermissible bolstering through a witness’s out-of-court identification. By confirming that Rule 801(d)(1)(C) covers implied as well as explicit identification statements — so long as the identifying witness is subject to cross-examination — the court reinforces that eyewitness identification evidence carries wide admissibility even when the victim does not make a formal in-court identification.
The decision also underscores the difficulty of obtaining a mistrial based solely on a single, promptly-stricken officer statement when independent physical and forensic evidence is strong. Defense practitioners should note that framing a mistrial motion around prosecutorial fault does not, under Arizona law, lower the appellate bar: the governing standard remains abuse of discretion, leaving trial courts with substantial latitude to cure evidentiary missteps through instruction rather than retrial.