Background
Lance Weber met Nancy at the Yucca Tap Room bar in Tempe, where they engaged in consensual kissing and affectionate conduct for approximately two hours. Nancy agreed to give Weber a ride home. At his residence, after consensual kissing and petting, Nancy told Weber she needed to leave. Weber blocked her from leaving, restrained her against her will, removed her clothing, and digitally penetrated her three times while attempting penile-vaginal intercourse. Nancy resisted throughout, telling Weber to stop. She managed to escape and flee the home, leaving her shoes and wallet behind.
Nancy was found to have 34 injuries including bruises on her neck. Police discovered her belongings at Weber’s residence and found visible injuries on Weber consistent with Nancy’s account of their struggle. DNA analysis confirmed Weber’s DNA on Nancy’s breasts. A grand jury indicted Weber for kidnapping, sexual assault, sexual abuse, simple assault, and attempted sexual assault. A jury convicted him of two counts of sexual assault, one count of attempted sexual assault, and two counts of simple assault. Weber received a sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment with supervised probation.
On direct appeal, Weber’s convictions were affirmed. Years later, he filed successive post-conviction relief petitions claiming ineffective assistance of counsel regarding surveillance video from the bar and alleging actual innocence based on the full surveillance footage.
The Court’s Holding
The Arizona Court of Appeals granted Weber’s petition for review but denied relief on all claims. The court found Weber’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims precluded because his second post-conviction relief petition was untimely—filed more than six years after the appellate mandate. Weber failed to explain the delay or demonstrate it was not his fault as required by Arizona’s procedural rules. Additionally, because Weber had raised IAC claims regarding surveillance video in his first post-conviction petition, those same claims could not be raised again in a successive petition under Arizona’s preclusion doctrine.
On the merits, the court rejected Weber’s actual innocence claim. The court found that the additional surveillance video from the bar would not be material to the verdict because the conduct shown at the bar—consensual kissing and affectionate contact—was not disputed at trial. Nancy herself admitted to engaging in consensual physical affection with Weber at the bar. The actual crimes for which Weber was convicted occurred at his residence, not at the bar, and the disputed issue was what occurred there, not what happened at the establishment. The full surveillance video could not, by clear and convincing evidence, demonstrate that no reasonable juror would convict given the evidence of what transpired at the residence.
Key Takeaways
- Post-conviction relief petitions must strictly comply with Arizona’s timing rules: constitutional claims must be filed within 90 days of sentencing or 30 days after appellate mandate, whichever is later.
- Ineffective assistance of counsel claims cannot be raised repeatedly and are precluded if previously raised in any prior post-conviction proceeding.
- To establish actual innocence, newly discovered evidence must be material and capable of changing the outcome—evidence about undisputed trial conduct does not suffice.
- Defendants seeking post-conviction relief bear the burden of showing the trial court abused its discretion in denying their petition.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces Arizona’s strict procedural requirements for post-conviction relief, emphasizing that defendants must comply with filing deadlines or forfeit their right to relief. The court’s emphasis on preclusion doctrine limits opportunities to relitigate claims across multiple petitions, creating finality in criminal proceedings. For practitioners, the decision clarifies that post-conviction claims must address the actual disputed issues at trial—evidence that merely corroborates undisputed conduct will not satisfy the clear and convincing evidence standard for actual innocence.
The decision also underscores that consensual conduct preceding a sexual assault does not negate or diminish the criminal nature of subsequent non-consensual conduct, and juries are entitled to accept a victim’s account of events that occurred after the consensual phase ended. The case illustrates courts’ deference to jury verdicts when sufficient evidence supports the conviction and later-discovered evidence does not materially alter the calculus of guilt.