Background
Donovan Chaz Draper was convicted by a Washington County jury of raping a child under age fourteen and was sentenced to 300 months in prison. The amended information alleged that the offense occurred in or about 2022.
The seven-year-old victim testified that Draper told her to perform oral sex on him in a bathroom and that his “private” went inside her mouth. She identified Draper in court. Draper challenged the proof of the offense date, the sufficiency of the child’s testimony, and the trial court’s refusal to strike a prospective juror who had extensive experience working with abused children.
The Court’s Holding
The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed. Draper did not preserve his argument that the State failed to prove the date of the rape because his directed-verdict motions did not raise that specific ground at trial.
The court held that the victim’s testimony was substantial evidence of rape. Her testimony identified Draper, described penetration of her mouth by his penis, and established that she was under fourteen. Any inconsistencies or uncertainty in her testimony were credibility questions for the jury.
The court also held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by declining to excuse Juror Eleven for cause. Although the juror said she was weary of such cases because of her prior work with abused children, she said she could be objective and listen to both sides.
Key Takeaways
- A sufficiency argument must be specifically raised in a directed-verdict motion to be preserved for appeal.
- A child victim’s uncorroborated testimony can alone support a rape conviction when it describes the prohibited conduct.
- Prior experience with abuse victims does not require removal for cause when a prospective juror can remain fair and objective.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces Arkansas’s strict preservation rule for sufficiency challenges and confirms that juries may credit a child victim’s testimony despite inconsistencies or limited recall of timing. It also illustrates the substantial discretion trial courts retain in assessing prospective-juror bias.