Background
In December 2022, outgoing members of the Helena-West Helena city council passed Ordinances 39-22 and 40-22, which included provisions increasing the mayor’s salary from $48,000 to $70,000. The outgoing mayor attempted to veto the ordinances, and newly elected Mayor Christopher Franklin attempted to rescind that veto. Greg Williams, a city resident, sued the City and Franklin for a declaratory judgment and temporary restraining order, contending that the ordinances had been vetoed and were void.
The Phillips County Circuit Court issued an ex parte temporary restraining order on January 11, 2023, and extended it on January 25. Both orders prohibited Franklin from acting under the ordinances “until such time a full adjudication can be had.” In April 2023, the circuit court declared the ordinances null and void, along with actions taken under them, but did not enter injunctive relief. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed that judgment in City of Helena-West Helena v. Williams, 2024 Ark. 102, 689 S.W.3d 62.
Williams later sought contempt, asserting that Franklin had violated the January TRO by receiving the increased salary. The city clerk testified that Franklin directed him around February 1, 2023, to increase the mayor’s salary budget line to $70,000. Franklin maintained that he accepted the salary based on the council-approved budget rather than the voided ordinances. The circuit court nevertheless found that Franklin willfully disobeyed its 2023 order declaring the ordinances void. It ordered him to purge the civil contempt within ninety days by repaying $23,000.05 or report to jail. The supreme court stayed that order pending appeal.
The Court’s Holding
The supreme court reversed and dismissed. Reviewing the civil-contempt finding to determine whether it was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence, the court explained that contempt compels compliance with a valid court order and that the order must definitely and clearly impose a duty. Although Williams framed his motion as enforcement of the TRO, the circuit court actually found Franklin in contempt for violating the declaratory judgment.
The TROs could not support that ruling because their own language terminated them upon full adjudication, which occurred with the April 2023 final order. That order neither made the TRO permanent nor directed Franklin to comply. The court also noted in a footnote that, regardless of the orders’ wording, Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(2) limits a TRO to fourteen days and an extension to fourteen additional days.
The court held that a declaratory judgment itself cannot be enforced through contempt. Such a judgment determines rights and liabilities and provides a noncoercive means of resolving legal uncertainty. An injunction is different: it is an equitable, in personam command requiring a person to perform or refrain from a particular act, and its violation may be punished through contempt. The proper statutory avenue here was a request for supplemental relief under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-111-108, which permits further relief based on a declaratory judgment when necessary or proper, potentially including an injunction. Because the circuit court instead enforced the declaratory judgment through contempt, its finding was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.
Key Takeaways
- An Arkansas declaratory judgment, standing alone, cannot serve as the basis for civil contempt.
- A party seeking coercive enforcement may request supplemental relief, including an injunction, under section 16-111-108.
- The TROs expired by their terms upon final adjudication, and the final declaratory judgment contained no permanent injunction or compliance command.
- Franklin could not assert James Valley’s due-process arguments on appeal because he lacked standing to raise them; Justice Womack concurred without opinion, Justice Webb did not participate, and Special Justice Cory Cox joined.
Why It Matters
The decision draws a firm practical distinction between obtaining a declaration of rights and securing an enforceable coercive command. Attorneys seeking compliance with a declaratory judgment must pursue appropriate supplemental relief rather than assume that noncompliance alone supports contempt.
The ruling is tied to the order actually enforced: the circuit court expressly relied on its declaratory judgment, not a continuing injunction. It therefore does not disturb the established principle that violation of a valid injunction may be punished through a circuit court’s contempt powers.