Background
Robert Frank Donaci was granted bail in September 2025 on numerous drug-related charges, including trafficking in dangerous drugs, allegedly committed while he was on parole. His bail conditions included an overnight curfew, limits on mobile-phone possession and internet access, and a requirement to wear an electronic monitoring device. He was also separately subject to parole conditions.
Donaci applied to vary the bail order so that he could pursue employment as a sales representative. He sought removal of the curfew and electronic monitor, permission to possess a second phone for work, and restoration of internet access. The primary judge removed the internet prohibition, subject to monitoring, but refused the other variations. Donaci appealed and sought to rely on three additional affidavits concerning his caregiving responsibilities, an alleged confrontation prompted by the visible ankle monitor, and his stepson’s psychological condition.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal. It held that the decision whether to vary bail conditions was discretionary and could be disturbed only on the principles in House v The King. The primary judge had applied the correct statutory question under the Bail Act 1980 (Qld)—whether the conditions were more onerous than necessary—and was entitled to conclude that the curfew, one-phone restriction, and electronic monitoring remained justified given the seriousness of the alleged offending and the need for police monitoring.
The Court rejected Donaci’s argument that monitoring under both bail and parole amounted to unnecessary “double loading,” explaining that parole and bail operate under different statutory regimes and are supervised by different agencies. It also found no error in the primary judge’s treatment of the asserted rights under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): several arguments had not been advanced below, and in any event the conditions did not amount to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment, undermine the presumption of innocence, or create double jeopardy.
The Court refused leave to adduce the three affidavits as fresh evidence. The evidence either could have been obtained earlier, raised credibility concerns, or was unlikely to have had an important influence on the original decision. Events occurring after the primary judge’s ruling could not establish that the judge had erred by failing to address them.
Key Takeaways
- An appellate court will not revisit a discretionary bail ruling merely because another outcome was reasonably available; intervention requires an error of the kind identified in House v The King.
- Concurrent bail and parole monitoring is not necessarily duplicative because the two forms of supervision arise under different statutory regimes and are administered by different authorities.
- Human-rights objections must be properly developed before the primary judge, and fresh evidence on appeal must satisfy the requirements of reasonable diligence, likely importance, and apparent credibility.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the demanding standard for overturning discretionary bail conditions in Queensland. Compliance with existing conditions and their impact on employment are relevant, but they do not automatically establish that restrictions have become more onerous than necessary, particularly where serious alleged offending and monitoring risks remain.
It also underscores that human-rights arguments must be tied concretely to the decision under review. Merely identifying protected rights, without explaining how the challenged conditions unlawfully limit them, will generally be insufficient.