Background
Spiros Karpatsis was sentenced on 19 June 2024 by the Sydney Drug Court (Acting Judge Still, the “initial sentencing judge”) in relation to nine offences involving breaking and entering, theft, drug possession, and a driving offence. The initial sentencing judge indicated a sentence of 4 years and 2 months imprisonment and, pursuant to s 7A(5)(b) of the Drug Court Act 1998 (NSW), suspended execution to allow Karpatsis to complete the Drug Court program. He received a 25% discount for early guilty pleas. Between June 2024 and March 2025 he accumulated sanctions — brief periods of imprisonment — for non-compliance, and on 17 March 2025 his program was terminated in his absence. He was arrested on a termination warrant on 8 June 2025.
On 5 August 2025, the Parramatta Drug Court (Judge McIntyre, the “final sentencing judge”) revoked the suspension order and imposed an aggregate sentence of 3 years and 2 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 1 year and 8 months, commencing 5 November 2024. That backdated commencement date reflected 273 days of credit across four categories: 164 days bail-refused custody before the initial sentence (excluding a period also spent serving revoked parole for unrelated offences), 46 days of s 8A sanctions, 5 days of quasi-custody in residential rehabilitation, and 58 days post-termination warrant custody.
Karpatsis, self-represented on appeal, challenged the sentence on two grounds: (1) the final sentencing judge erred in not commencing the sentence from the date nominated by the initial sentencing judge (26 August 2023, the date of his original arrest); and (2) neither sentencing judge applied s 58 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), which limits consecutive sentences in the Local Court jurisdiction, when dealing with two offences (sequences 5 and 6) disposed of summarily.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Criminal Appeal (Cavanagh, Rigg and Roberts JJ) unanimously dismissed the appeal. On Ground 1, Rigg J held that no error of law or wrong application of principle had been demonstrated. The initial sentencing judge was not required to set — and did not set — a commencement date, as ss 44–48 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act do not apply at that stage of Drug Court proceedings: Drug Court Act, s 7A(4). The figure of 258 days mentioned by the initial sentencing judge was simply an acknowledgment of time spent in custody and an encouragement to engage with the program; it was not a nominated start date. The Court found that all time since Karpatsis’s arrest in August 2023 had been properly accounted for under the Drug Court Act and the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, and that the final sentencing judge’s refusal to credit the period spent concurrently serving revoked parole for unrelated offences was a lawful exercise of discretion in accordance with the principles in Callaghan v R [2006] NSWCCA 58.
On Ground 2, the Court held that s 58 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act — which restricts the Local Court from imposing consecutive sentences that would extend beyond five years from the commencement of an existing sentence — had no operation here. At the time of both sentencing exercises, Karpatsis was not serving an “existing sentence” within the meaning of s 58(4). His earlier dishonesty sentence had commenced on 8 August 2021 and expired (including revoked parole) by 23 December 2023, well before the initial sentencing judge dealt with him on 19 June 2024. Accordingly, s 58 did not constrain either sentencing judge, rendering the ground moot regardless of whether s 58 applies to a Drug Court judge exercising Local Court jurisdiction.
Key Takeaways
- Under the Drug Court Act, the initial sentencing judge is not required to set a sentence commencement date; that task falls to the final sentencing judge upon program termination, who must account for all relevant custody periods under s 12(2) of the Drug Court Act.
- A period spent in custody that is simultaneously referable to bail refusal for the current offences and service of revoked parole for unrelated offences need not be fully credited toward the new sentence — the treatment of such concurrent periods is a matter of judicial discretion guided by Callaghan v R.
- Time spent on bail, even subject to a home detention condition, does not attract a statutory entitlement to 50% (or any) credit: R v Quinlin [2021] NSWCCA 284; YA v R [2026] NSWCCA 38.
- Section 58 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act only operates where an offender is already serving an “existing sentence” at the time of the new sentencing; a fully expired sentence does not enliven the provision.
- An appeal under s 5AF(1) / s 5AA of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 is a strict-sense appeal: the appellant must demonstrate an error of law or wrong application of principle, not merely a preferred factual outcome.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the mechanics of Drug Court sentencing in New South Wales, particularly the division of responsibility between the initial and final sentencing judges when calculating commencement dates. Practitioners advising clients who have completed — or failed to complete — Drug Court programs will benefit from the Court’s systematic treatment of how overlapping custody periods (bail refusal, revoked parole, s 8A sanctions, residential rehabilitation) are categorised and credited, and from the reminder that no single figure mentioned by the initial judge binds the final sentencing exercise.
The Court’s reaffirmation that s 58 requires an existing (unexpired) sentence also serves as a practical reminder that the Local Court consecutive-sentence cap cannot be triggered by prior sentences that have already expired, a point of significance for Defence practitioners who might otherwise invoke the provision to argue jurisdictional limits in multi-offence Drug Court matters.