Background
This is the fifth decision in the Onakoya litigation concerning a dispute with the Sydney Children’s Hospitals Network. On 12 June 2026, Campbell J made orders upholding the defendant’s objections to parts of the plaintiffs’ Notices to Produce for Inspection and a Notice to Admit Facts, while dismissing the plaintiffs’ application for summary dismissal of substantive aspects of the Defence. On 15 June 2026, before the judge’s reasons were published, the plaintiffs filed a Notice of Motion seeking to set aside those orders under Uniform Civil Procedure Rules r 36.15, arguing they had been denied procedural fairness.
The plaintiffs contended that the defendant had failed to provide documents central to their summary judgment application, preventing them from properly contesting the factual basis of the Defence. They argued this procedural failing amounted to an irregularity justifying the court reopening the decided orders.
The Court’s Holding
Campbell J dismissed the motion, holding that rule 36.15 is narrowly concerned with procedural irregularity in the process by which orders are made, not with the substantive merits of a decision. The court emphasized that such applications must be exercised “sparingly and with caution” and are not meant to permit litigants to re-agitate issues already determined against them. The judge noted that proper channels, such as appeals, exist for challenging substantive disagreements with a court’s decision.
The court rejected the procedural fairness argument on multiple grounds. First, the plaintiffs bore the heavy onus of presenting evidence in support of their own summary dismissal application; the defendant had no obligation to prove the plaintiffs’ case. Second, procedural fairness does not require one party to provide documents to support the other party’s case. Third, the court noted that matters such as justification, qualified privilege, and statutory immunity typically require factual inquiry that cannot be resolved through argument alone at summary judgment. Finally, the pronouncement of orders with reasons reserved does not constitute an irregularity.
Key Takeaways
- Rule 36.15 applications are confined to procedural irregularities and cannot serve as a backdoor appeal mechanism to revisit substantive disagreements.
- A party seeking summary dismissal bears the burden of presenting its own evidence; procedural fairness does not require the opposing party to supply that evidence.
- Finality of orders, even interlocutory orders, is an important principle in civil procedure and is not lightly disturbed absent genuine procedural defect.
- Courts will not reopen decided matters merely because a litigant believes the outcome was incorrect; appellate procedures exist for that purpose.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the limited scope of rule 36.15 and guards against its misuse as a circumvention of the appellate system. It clarifies the burden of proof in summary judgment applications and confirms that a party cannot delegate its evidentiary load to the opposing party. The judgment demonstrates the court’s commitment to procedural efficiency and finality while protecting access to proper appellate review for genuine grievances.
The decision will be of particular interest to litigants and practitioners navigating summary dismissal applications and understanding the strict constraints on reopening orders in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.