Background
Joshua Pele was tried with co-accused in the District Court of New South Wales on charges arising from the armed abduction and detention of Sam Amine in June 2021. The prosecution alleged that four masked men entered Amine’s home, removed him in a vehicle and detained and assaulted him at a granny flat while demanding $3 million. The case against Pele was circumstantial and included DNA, fingerprint, vehicle, clothing and arrest evidence. The jury convicted him of specially aggravated break and enter and of detaining a person in company without consent, with intent to obtain a financial advantage, occasioning actual bodily harm.
During deliberations, the jury asked detailed questions about the meaning of “in company,” whether an accused needed to be present throughout the detention or during particular acts, and whether additional people could have been involved. Defence counsel argued that the questions suggested impermissible private legal research and sought discharge of the jury or, alternatively, an inquiry of the foreperson. The trial judge refused, finding the questions consistent with an attempt to understand the legal directions in the context of the evidence. Pele appealed his convictions, alleging that the failure to investigate possible juror misconduct caused a miscarriage of justice. He did not appeal his aggregate sentence of six years and three months’ imprisonment.
The Court’s Holding
The Court granted an extension of time and leave to appeal but unanimously dismissed the appeal. Applying the “double might” test from HCF v The Queen, the Court held that a miscarriage of justice based on juror misconduct requires facts, found on the balance of probabilities, from which a fair-minded and informed member of the public might reasonably apprehend that the jury or a juror might not have decided the case according to law, the evidence and the judge’s directions.
No extrinsic evidence showed that any juror had conducted private research. The jury’s questions, considered alongside the evidence, counsel’s submissions and the judge’s directions, were reasonably explained as efforts to understand the complicated “in company” element. The allegation of internet research—whether about the law, Pele or his brother—remained conjecture, guesswork or surmise. The trial judge therefore committed no error or irregularity by declining to examine the foreperson, and no miscarriage of justice was established.
Chen J additionally observed that Pele did not challenge the trial judge’s dispositive finding that the questions were consistent with proper deliberation or her refusal to discharge the jury. The appeal instead sought to establish a miscarriage through the failure to inquire, even though both the discharge request and the proposed inquiry depended on the same rejected inference of misconduct. Unlike HCF, this case involved no established jury irregularity.
Key Takeaways
- Detailed or legally framed jury questions do not, without objective supporting facts, establish that jurors conducted prohibited private research.
- Before applying the reasonable-apprehension test for juror misconduct, an appellate court must identify relevant facts extrinsic to the jury’s deliberations on the balance of probabilities; speculation is insufficient.
- A trial judge need not examine a foreperson merely because counsel raises the possibility of misconduct, particularly where the questions are reasonably explained by the evidence, submissions and judicial directions.
Why It Matters
The decision clarifies that the High Court’s framework in HCF v The Queen does not dispense with the need for an evidentiary foundation for alleged jury misconduct. Courts will protect the integrity of jury trials while also respecting jurors’ oath, presumed adherence to directions and legitimate efforts to resolve difficult legal issues.
For appellate practitioners, the judgment also highlights the importance of challenging the trial judge’s underlying factual findings and ruling directly. An appellant cannot readily avoid an unchallenged finding that no misconduct occurred by reframing the complaint solely as a failure to investigate.