Background
The appellant and complainant married in 2016 and lived together until August 2022. In March 2020, while the complainant’s parents were staying at the family home—with the complainant’s mother recovering from surgery—an incident occurred in a bedroom. The appellant came in, angry that the complainant was attending to her mother rather than his child. He grabbed the complainant’s neck with both hands on two separate occasions within minutes, applying pressure that restricted her breathing. The complainant did not consent. The complainant’s mother was present and witnessed both incidents. The complainant did not report the matter to police until March 2023, more than two years later, and only after separating from the appellant and engaging a family law lawyer.
At trial, the appellant was charged with two counts of strangulation in a domestic setting, arising from the two separate occasions of neck-grabbing on the same day. The jury convicted on count 1 but acquitted on count 2. The appellant appealed, arguing the verdicts were logically inconsistent because both the complainant and her mother gave evidence of both incidents, and if their credibility was sufficient for count 1, it must be sufficient for count 2.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal (Boddice JA, with Bowskill CJ and Henry J agreeing) dismissed the appeal. The court held that verdicts are unreasonable on the ground of inconsistency only if they cannot stand together according to logic and reasonableness, or if they represent an affront to logic and common sense suggesting jury compromise or confusion. However, where a proper reconciliation of verdicts is possible, appellate courts must accept it if the jury properly performed their functions.
The court found the verdicts were logically reconcilable. First, the jury was entitled to accept the complainant’s account of both incidents while affording the appellant the benefit of doubt on the second count. A verdict of acquittal does not necessarily indicate the jury disbelieved the complainant; rather, it may reflect the jury’s exercise of fairness. Second, the complainant’s mother gave evidence that the first occasion involved choking for five to six seconds, while the second was shorter. The jury could rationally conclude that although the second occasion occurred, it was so fleeting as not to warrant a conviction while the first occasion met the criminal standard. This reconciliation was supported by the appellant’s own evidence, which—while not persuasive as to accidental contact—actually supported at least one occasion of choking by his description of how his hand was positioned on the complainant’s neck.
Key Takeaways
- Inconsistent jury verdicts are not automatically unreasonable; courts must seek a proper reconciliation before setting verdicts aside.
- A jury may accept a witness’s credibility on some counts while acquitting on others without this reflecting a loss of faith in the witness, particularly where duration or severity of conduct differs between counts.
- Juries may apply an “innate sense of fairness” in deciding whether to convict on all counts technically proven, even in domestic violence prosecutions.
- The trial judge’s direction that each count is separate and verdicts need not be identical gives a jury proper authority to reach different conclusions on similar facts.
Why It Matters
This decision provides important guidance for appellants challenging inconsistent verdicts in domestic violence cases. It establishes that the logic allowing different verdicts extends beyond different witnesses or circumstances to cases where the same witness testifies about two similar incidents. The court’s willingness to find the verdicts reconcilable despite the mother’s evidence of both incidents—and her credible testimony about duration differences—illustrates that appellate courts will defer to jury assessments of fairness and proportionality. For domestic violence prosecutors and defence practitioners, the case confirms that juries may exercise discretion to convict on some counts of similar conduct while acquitting on others, without this indicating any defect in witness credibility or jury function.
The decision also reflects the court’s recognition that jury verdicts may be driven by considerations beyond strict legal proof—what the court termed the jury’s “innate sense of fairness and justice”—and that appellate courts will respect such verdicts provided they are logically reconcilable with the evidence at trial.
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