Background
On 27 June 2022, Yusuf Nazlioglu was shot and killed in the basement car park of his apartment building in Rhodes, New South Wales. As he stepped out of his car upon arriving home at approximately 6:25 PM, a gunman emerged from a stolen Volkswagen Golf and shot him eight times — including twice to the head — with at least one shot fired while he lay on the ground. His wife, Jade Jeske, was in the car and witnessed the murder. The shooting was the product of extensive planning: participants conducted multiple reconnaissance visits to the building over the preceding days, used stolen vehicles fitted with false number plates, burned evidence immediately after the killing, and communicated through means designed to evade police detection.
Abdulrahman Atteya and Mohammed Hosni Khaled were tried and convicted of murder by a jury in June 2025. Rabeih Baltagi — found to have been the directing figure of the group and who was physically present at the scene — fled to Lebanon in July 2022, funded by Atteya, and had not returned to Australia. The sentencing proceedings were delayed significantly due to the need to obtain expert evidence about Atteya’s cognitive capacity. The maximum penalty for murder under s 19A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) is life imprisonment, with a standard non-parole period of 20 years prescribed.
The alleged motive was that Nazlioglu had effectively stolen two luxury hire cars. Atteya had no personal relationship with the victim; the court found his participation was driven primarily by loyalty to Baltagi and some financial reward, though the precise amount could not be established beyond reasonable doubt. Khaled’s role was logistical: he conducted initial reconnaissance of Nazlioglu’s parking bay, helped stage vehicles used in the operation, drove Atteya and Baltagi to the getaway car on the night of the killing, and subsequently helped burn the escape vehicle and conceal the electric scooters used to flee the scene.
The Court’s Holding
Sweeney J sentenced Atteya to a total term of 34 years’ imprisonment, comprising a non-parole period of 25 years and 6 months commencing 14 June 2023 (expiring 13 December 2048) and an additional term of 8 years and 6 months. Khaled was sentenced to a total term of 24 years, comprising a non-parole period of 18 years commencing 19 January 2024 (expiring 18 January 2042) and an additional term of 6 years. Life imprisonment was considered but not imposed. Both offenders were advised of the operation of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW).
On the disputed question of Atteya’s precise role, the court found it was unable to determine beyond reasonable doubt that he was the shooter rather than the driver of the Golf, but also declined to affirmatively find he was not the shooter. Crucially, Sweeney J held that the culpability of the shooter and driver were barely distinguishable given the planned, collaborative nature of the enterprise. The court found that Atteya had been an active participant in the agreement to kill Nazlioglu from at least 18 June 2022, engaging in reconnaissance, organising vehicles, attending the scene on both the failed attempt on 26 June and the successful shooting on 27 June, and subsequently funding Baltagi’s flight to Lebanon to evade police.
As to Khaled, the court resolved multiple disputed factual issues against him, finding beyond reasonable doubt that he had joined the agreement to kill Nazlioglu as of 18 June 2022 (when he conducted covert reconnaissance of Nazlioglu’s parking bay with knowledge of the murder plan), that he drove the stolen Range Rover to the Hoxton Park Reserve car park for use as a getaway vehicle, that he transported Atteya and Baltagi to their getaway car on the night of the murder, and that he burned the Mercedes used in the killing and concealed the scooters afterwards. The court was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Khaled had performed the equivalent transport role on the prior night of the aborted attempt, 26 June, due to a gap in the evidence.
Key Takeaways
- Where a court cannot determine whether a co-offender was the actual shooter or the driver in a planned execution-style murder, it may treat their culpability as functionally equivalent if the roles were interdependent and each indispensable to the joint criminal enterprise.
- Adverse factual findings at sentencing (beyond reasonable doubt standard) can be drawn from circumstantial evidence — including phone tower data, CCTV movements, vehicle tracking, and post-offence conduct — even where direct evidence of a particular role is absent.
- A logistical participant in a meticulously planned murder (reconnaissance, vehicle staging, evidence destruction) may attract a substantial sentence even where that person was not present at the moment of killing, particularly where the court finds the participant had full knowledge of the murder plan.
- The court expressed its duty to make factual findings consistent with jury verdicts, with facts adverse to the offender proved beyond reasonable doubt and favourable facts on the balance of probabilities.
Why It Matters
This sentencing judgment provides a detailed illustration of how NSW courts approach complex, multi-offender murder proceedings where facts are sharply contested and roles are not fully established. The decision underscores that participation in a highly organised criminal enterprise — through planning, vehicle logistics, and evidence destruction — can attract sentences approaching those of the person who pulls the trigger, particularly where the court is satisfied the participant acted with full knowledge of and commitment to the lethal plan. The explicit refusal to impose life imprisonment, combined with substantial non-parole periods well exceeding the 20-year standard, also demonstrates the court calibrating sentence to the gravity of a premeditated, execution-style killing while leaving open the path to eventual parole review.
The case further highlights the evidentiary significance of phone tower location data, CCTV analysis, and post-offence conduct (such as funding a co-offender’s flight abroad and disposing of evidence) in establishing participation in planned violence where the perpetrators deliberately minimised their digital footprint. Both offenders were also formally notified of the high-risk offender supervision regime, signalling ongoing community protection concerns that may follow beyond the custodial term.