Background
BFI was charged with 10 offences arising from alleged events involving the same complainant over three days in May 2024. A District Court jury acquitted him of seven counts, including rape, sexual assault, assault causing bodily harm, and strangulation, but convicted him of three offences alleged to have occurred on 6 May 2024: unlawfully assaulting the complainant by throwing her to the ground (count 6); assaulting and causing bodily harm by dragging her along the ground, causing abrasions (count 7); and unlawfully depriving her of liberty by preventing her from leaving a bedroom by physical force (count 8).
The complainant said that, after an argument about the appellant leaving the house, he pushed her to the ground, dragged her from his bedroom to hers, shut and locked the door, and hit her as she tried to reach it. Her son heard screaming and her calls to dial triple 0; police observed her emerge from behind the appellant when the bedroom door opened; and photographs and medical evidence recorded injuries including abrasions consistent with being dragged across carpet. The appellant accepted that he pushed her from his room and later positioned his body between her and the bedroom door as she tried to leave, but denied dragging her.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal. The guilty verdicts on counts 6 to 8 were not rendered unreasonable by the acquittals on the other counts. There was a rational basis to distinguish the convictions: the appellant made significant admissions relevant to counts 6 and 8, the son’s and attending police officers’ evidence provided support, and the medical and photographic evidence materially supported the dragging allegation in count 7. The three convicted counts also formed a continuum of conduct distinguishable from the other allegations.
The Court rejected the complaint about the directions on deprivation of liberty. The trial judge had directed the jury that the Crown had to prove the particulars, including that the complainant was prevented from leaving by physical force, and was not required to repeat a count-specific direction when answering the jury’s later general question about whether particulars had to be proved. The Court also held that provocation and prevention of repetition of insult were not properly raised on the evidence concerning the subsequent dragging alleged in count 7. In any event, the omission could not realistically have affected the verdict because the jury had rejected those defences on count 6, where they had a substantially stronger factual basis.
Key Takeaways
- Different verdicts across multiple counts do not make convictions unsafe if the evidence provides a rational basis for distinguishing the counts.
- A trial judge may answer a general jury question about proof of particulars without restating directions for every individual count.
- A defence need only be left to a jury where the evidence could reasonably support it; any omission must also be material to the verdict to establish a miscarriage of justice.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the high threshold for overturning convictions on the basis of allegedly inconsistent jury verdicts. Acquittals on some allegations do not necessarily show that a jury rejected a complainant’s evidence wholesale, particularly where the convicted counts are supported by admissions or independent evidence.
It also confirms that appellate courts will assess jury-direction complaints in their trial context, including whether the defence was truly available on the evidence and whether an asserted omission could realistically have affected the jury’s reasoning.