Background
The accused, aged 16 years and 5 months at the time of the alleged offence, was charged with the murder and alternatively the manslaughter of a 32-year-old man on 10 June 2023 at Tregear. The deceased, who suffered from Marfan syndrome with an artificial aortic valve, was vulnerable and significantly weakened by previous strokes. The Crown alleged that over four days (7–10 June 2023), the deceased was repeatedly assaulted by four people—the accused, her boyfriend DA, his friend DT, and another woman SB—resulting in fatal blunt force head trauma.
The Crown’s case relied on three main bodies of evidence: eyewitness testimony from two visitors to the house (Shauna James and Angel Green) describing numerous assaults; three videos showing the accused and DT assaulting the deceased; medical evidence establishing death from subdural haematoma; and forensic evidence. Critically, the Crown initially alleged the accused’s own acts caused death but abandoned this theory during trial, pivoting instead to complicity through joint criminal enterprise liability.
The accused suffered from Intellectual Developmental Disorder (Mild), documented developmental trauma, cannabis use disorder, and significant psychological vulnerabilities. She was dependent on her boyfriend for basic needs and accommodation. She pleaded not guilty to both charges and elected a judge-alone trial.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Rigg entered verdicts of not guilty on both the murder and manslaughter charges. The critical issue was whether the Crown proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the nature of any agreement the accused had with others to commit a crime; and (2) her participation in that joint criminal enterprise. While the Crown proved extensive violence was inflicted on the deceased, it failed to establish the essential elements of a joint criminal enterprise involving the accused.
The medical evidence established that death resulted from subdural haematoma caused by blunt force head injury, but the experts could not identify which specific blow(s) inflicted the fatal injury or prove that all blows substantially contributed to death. The brain had no signs of organized repair around the dura, suggesting the injury occurred within the four-day window, but multiple blows over days may have caused the fatal haematoma. The evidence predominantly established assaults by DA, DT, and SB; the accused’s role remained ambiguous—she was present during most violence, appeared in videos perpetrating some assaults, and witnesses testified she hit the deceased a few times, but this did not establish her participation in a criminal agreement with the requisite scope or her foresight of the fatal consequence.
The court emphasized that presence at the scene of a crime, without more, does not prove participation in a joint criminal enterprise. The Crown had to prove the nature of the agreement and the accused’s participation in it. Given the weakness of evidence specifically tying the accused to a shared intention to assault or cause harm, and her documented vulnerabilities and dependence, the court was not satisfied the Crown met its burden.
Key Takeaways
- Presence at the scene of violence, even combined with sporadic participation, does not automatically constitute participation in a joint criminal enterprise absent proof of agreement and shared intention.
- In circumstantial cases involving multiple perpetrators, the Crown must separately establish each accused’s role and state of mind; collapsing culpability across perpetrators is insufficient.
- Medical evidence about causation of death, even when fatal injury is established, may not identify the specific blow or perpetrator responsible, creating reasonable doubt about complicity liability.
- Expert evidence regarding an accused’s intellectual disability, developmental trauma, and dependence on others is relevant to assessing whether they truly agreed to participate in a criminal enterprise or were manipulated into presence.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the high bar for joint criminal enterprise liability in group violence cases, particularly where the Crown’s theory shifts mid-trial from direct causation to complicity. Courts will not infer agreement or shared intention from mere presence or isolated acts of violence without affirmative evidence of the accused’s state of mind and understanding of the enterprise. The judgment also signals that an accused’s personal vulnerabilities—intellectual disability, trauma, and dependence—are material to assessing whether they possessed the capacity to form the necessary agreement or were, in effect, controlled or coerced by others.
For prosecutors, the decision underscores the importance of building discrete, substantiated theories of liability for each accused rather than a sprawling group culpability narrative. For defence counsel, it demonstrates that detailed expert evidence about an accused’s cognitive and psychological deficits can rebut inferences of conspiracy or agreement, even in the face of eyewitness testimony and video evidence of the accused’s physical presence and participation in isolated assaults.