Background
The plaintiff, a former migration agent turned solicitor, sought restoration of his practising certificate with the Law Society of NSW after a five-year ban by the Migration Agents Registration Authority (MARA) and subsequent denial of practising certificates. The Law Society had refused multiple applications for reinstatement, citing lack of insight into his wrongdoing and refusal to acknowledge findings against him by MARA and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). Justice Elkaim heard the principal proceedings over two days in late June 2026 and dismissed the plaintiff’s summons on 9 July 2026.
On 13 July 2026, merely four days after the judgment, the plaintiff filed a notice of motion seeking three forms of relief: correction of asserted errors in the judgment; reconsideration of the court’s conclusions; and suppression orders under the Court Suppression and Non-Publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) to prevent publication of his name.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Elkaim dismissed all aspects of the motion. On the alleged errors, the court found no relevant mistakes in the judgment. The plaintiff objected to language stating the Law Society had “put him in touch with” Mr Neil Watt, an expert in professional discipline, but the court found the evidence established this occurred “on Law Society’s advice” and perceived no meaningful distinction warranting correction.
More significantly, the court rejected the plaintiff’s attempts to reconsider substantive findings. The plaintiff sought to revisit conclusions about his rehabilitation efforts, the money spent in pursuing reinstatement, and the extent of his acceptance of MARA and AAT findings. Justice Elkaim held that the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (UCPR) provisions for amending reasons and the inherent jurisdiction conferred by section 23 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) are “not a substitute for an appeal.” The court applied the High Court’s reasoning in Reid v Howard, holding that these powers exist only as necessary for the administration of justice and are not “at large.” Disagreement with a judgment or attempts to revisit substantive conclusions do not constitute grounds for amendment.
On suppression, the court dismissed the application for non-publication orders. The plaintiff claimed publication would cause “significant prejudice and serious and continuing harm” but provided no specific factual foundation. The court found that embarrassment and dissatisfaction with critical findings—common to every losing litigant—do not satisfy the statutory grounds in section 8(1) of the Court Suppression and Non-Publication Orders Act. The court also noted the plaintiff had not sought such relief when commencing proceedings or after permitting cross-examination, suggesting he had anticipated the possibility of an adverse outcome.
Key Takeaways
- Procedures for amending published judgments cannot be weaponized to revisit substantive conclusions; they address only actual errors and are not appellate mechanisms.
- A party’s disagreement with a judgment or desire to present a stronger case post-decision falls outside the scope of judgment amendment.
- Suppression and non-publication orders cannot be granted post-publication based solely on a litigant’s embarrassment or dissatisfaction with the findings.
- The inherent jurisdiction of superior courts under section 23 of the Supreme Court Act is circumscribed and exercisable only as necessary for the administration of justice.
Why It Matters
This judgment establishes important guardrails against the abuse of procedural remedies. By holding firm that amendment applications cannot serve as backdoor appeals, the court protects the finality of judgments and prevents parties from forum-shopping between appellate and procedural mechanisms. The decision reinforces that once a judgment is delivered and reasons published, courts will not revisit substantive conclusions merely because a party disagrees or wishes to present additional arguments—that is the province of appeal.
The suppression ruling is equally significant for attorneys and the legal profession. It clarifies that reputational harm and professional embarrassment stemming from adverse judicial findings do not constitute sufficient grounds for post-judgment suppression orders. This principle maintains the transparency of the judicial process and prevents parties from effectively redacting their own litigation defeats from the public record. The ruling affirms that judicial finality and the public’s right to see the courts operate must prevail over an individual litigant’s preferences regarding publicity.