Background
Bailey Steele was convicted by jury on 17 July 2024 of two offences: detaining a person in company with intent to intimidate with actual bodily harm (count 1) and robbery of cash and a gold watch (count 3), both under the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). At the same trial, the jury acquitted him of recklessly wounding in company (count 2). The offences arose from a single incident on 12–13 February 2022 involving the abduction and assault of one complainant (Mr Tarasenko) and the subsequent armed robbery of another (Mr Alamango).
Steele applied for leave to appeal against conviction, arguing that the guilty verdicts on counts 1 and 3 were logically inconsistent with the acquittal on count 2. He contended that the acquittal necessarily reflected reasonable doubt about the credibility of key prosecution witness RS, and that this doubt should have undermined the Crown’s case on counts 1 and 3, requiring acquittal on those counts as well. The application was brought more than 18 months after conviction, requiring an extension of time.
The Court’s Holding
The Court (Emmett J, Ward P, and Sweeney J) granted an extension of time and leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal. Although the delay was substantial and lacked satisfactory explanation, the Court found that none of the delay could be attributed to the applicant personally, and the interests of justice favoured determining the appeal on its merits. The Crown did not oppose the extension and pointed to no specific prejudice from the delay.
On the substantive issue, the Court held that the verdicts were not inconsistent. Applying established principles from Mackenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348 and MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606, the Court found that verdicts are only overturned for factual inconsistency if they constitute “an affront to logic and commonsense.” The evidence on each count was materially different. On count 2 (wounding), RS testified to events he had not personally witnessed—he heard Mr Tarasenko scream and saw the applicant with a bloody knife afterward. Critically, the complainant Mr Tarasenko had given inconsistent accounts: in his first two police interviews, he stated the cutting occurred in the car en route to Crackneck Point; at trial, he testified it occurred at the lookout. This created a rational basis for acquitting on the wounding charge without necessarily doubting RS’s credibility regarding counts 1 and 3.
On counts 1 and 3, the evidence was richer and more directly implicated the applicant. Count 1 (assault/detention) was supported by Mr Tarasenko’s direct account of the ordeal and his testimony that one assailant wore a grey GANT jumper (consistent with the applicant’s clothing). Count 3 (robbery of Alamango) was corroborated by RS’s evidence that the applicant was present, held a knife to Alamango’s face, made incriminating statements, and went to Alamango’s apartment. The jury could rationally accept part of RS’s evidence on some counts while rejecting it on others, or find parts of his evidence reliable when corroborated. The trial judge had properly instructed the jury that they could accept or reject a witness’s evidence in whole or in part, and consider each count separately.
Key Takeaways
- Verdicts on different counts need not stand on identical reasoning; a jury may convict on some counts while acquitting on others based on differences in evidence, witness reliability on specific issues, or the jury’s assessment of proof beyond reasonable doubt on each charge individually.
- Witness credibility is not an all-or-nothing proposition—juries may find a witness credible or reliable on some issues while doubting their account on others, particularly where a witness had not personally observed certain events or where the witness had a motive to lie about a particular matter.
- Appellate courts must be cautious about setting aside verdicts as logically inconsistent; they should search for a rational reconciliation and accord substantial deference to the jury’s constitutional role as fact-finder.
- Extensions of time for appeals against conviction are not automatic; while the Court will grant an extension where delay is not the applicant’s fault and the Crown does not point to prejudice, legal representatives should not assume extensions will be granted as a matter of course.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces established appellate doctrine that differential verdicts—convictions on some counts coupled with acquittals on others—do not automatically signal jury error or inconsistency. The case clarifies that where evidence differs materially between counts, where a prosecution witness did not personally observe key events on one count, or where the credibility assessment can be “quarantined” to particular issues, a jury’s decision to convict on some counts and acquit on others remains rational and entitled to respect. This is especially significant in complex multi-count trials involving multiple allegations, witnesses, and evidentiary strands.
The judgment also serves as a pointed reminder to the profession that time limits on criminal appeals exist for important reasons: passage of time can prejudice complainants, witnesses, and the community’s interest in finality. Courts will insist on compliance with applicable timetables and will not routinely grant extensions merely because a representative’s workload made timely submission impossible. Solicitors and counsel must treat applications for extension of time for conviction appeals with appropriate urgency from the moment a complete brief is obtained.