Background
Venetia Louise Storry was subject to a Federal Court vexatious-proceedings order and therefore could not institute Federal Court proceedings without leave under s 37AR of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). In March 2025, the Court refused her leave to bring proceedings relating to two matters, including QUD 18 of 2025.
QUD 18 concerned Ms Storry’s proposed appeal from Storry v Clout, in which an originating application seeking replacement of her trustee in bankruptcy was summarily dismissed, along with interlocutory applications. Ms Storry then sought leave to set aside the 2025 refusal order so that she could pursue that proposed appeal, relying on r 39.05(c) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 and Praljak v Office of the Australian Information Commissioner.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Longbottom refused leave. Under s 37AS(2), the Court had to dismiss the leave application if the proposed proceeding was vexatious, and the proposed attempt to set aside the earlier refusal order was so obviously untenable or manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless.
First, r 39.05(c), which permits an entered interlocutory order to be varied or set aside, did not apply because the 2025 refusal order was final: it conclusively determined Ms Storry’s rights concerning her leave application for QUD 18. Second, Praljak concerned statutory appeal rights from a time-extension decision and provided no basis to revisit a s 37AR refusal. Third, even assuming the rule applied, Ms Storry identified no changed circumstances, unavailable new evidence, or exceptional reason to reopen the matter; her grounds merely repeated arguments previously found completely without merit.
Key Takeaways
- A refusal of leave to institute proceedings under s 37AR can be a final, rather than interlocutory, order.
- Rule 39.05(c) cannot be used to set aside a final order.
- Repetition of previously rejected arguments does not justify reopening an order and may render a proposed proceeding vexatious.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores the Federal Court’s obligation to prevent vexatious proceedings while preserving finality in litigation. A litigant subject to a vexatious-proceedings order must identify a legally available path and a tenable basis for proposed proceedings; reframing rejected complaints as alleged legal error will not suffice.