Background
Emma Thompson, a self-represented litigant, is the subject of a bankruptcy administered by trustee Morgan Lane. The underlying disputes — spanning three consolidated Federal Court proceedings (QUD 447/2023, QUD 176/2024, and QUD 490/2025) — concern the trustee’s administration of her bankrupt estate, including the sale of two Queensland properties and the handling of funds held in trust. The matters have a substantial history: Justice Logan determined the original sequestration orders in 2022, the Full Court dismissed Thompson’s appeal in 2023, and Collier J refused interim relief sought by Thompson in October 2024 (Thompson v Lane [2024] FCA 1234). A subsequent application for leave to appeal that 2024 decision was refused in 2025, as was a later application for Collier J to recuse herself on grounds of actual and apprehended bias (Thompson v Lane (No 2) [2026] FCA 86). The three consolidated proceedings were set down for final hearing on 16 July 2026.
On 3 June 2026 — with the trial just weeks away — Thompson lodged a further interlocutory application seeking, among other things: a stay of the three proceedings; that a different judge determine the application; that the 2024 interlocutory decision be set aside in its entirety; orders removing Lane as trustee; orders for transfer of property and funds back to her; disclosure of the trustee’s accounts and communications; and a court-conducted review of the trustee’s administration under s 104 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The application was accepted for filing on the morning of the 17 June 2026 case management hearing.
The Court’s Holding
Collier J dismissed the interlocutory application with costs. The Court held that the relief sought was either an impermissible attempt to relitigate matters already determined, or duplicated relief already sought in the substantive proceedings proceeding to trial. The application to set aside the 2024 decision had no prospects of success: leave to appeal that decision had already been refused by another judge exercising appellate jurisdiction, and Thompson’s earlier recusal application — which also sought to set aside the 2024 decision — had likewise been dismissed. The request for a different judge to hear the application was treated as a renewed recusal bid that disclosed no fresh basis to depart from the earlier ruling in Thompson v Lane (No 2) [2026] FCA 86.
The remaining substantive relief — removal of the trustee, transfer of property and funds, and examination of proven debts — were found to replicate or overlap with the relief already pleaded in the three consolidated proceedings listed for imminent final hearing; those claims could and should be determined at trial. As to the application under s 104 of the Bankruptcy Act for review of the trustee’s decisions on proofs of debt, the Court held that Thompson had not identified any specific decision to be reviewed, had not sought an extension of the 21-day review period under s 33(1)(c), and accordingly the Court’s powers under s 104 were not enlivened. The application in that respect was dismissed as too vague to plead any relief the Court was empowered to order.
Separately, concerned that further pre-trial filings could disrupt the orderly progress of all three proceedings to their July 2026 hearing date, Collier J made a filing restriction order under r 1.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), prohibiting any party from filing further material in any of the three proceedings without leave of the Court until further order.
Key Takeaways
- A party cannot use an interlocutory application to set aside a prior interlocutory decision after leave to appeal that decision has already been refused; such an application will be dismissed as having no prospects of success and as an impermissible collateral attack on the appellate ruling.
- Interlocutory relief that merely replicates substantive relief already pleaded in proceedings heading to trial will be dismissed as duplicative — the trial is the appropriate forum for resolving those claims.
- A s 104 Bankruptcy Act application to review a trustee’s decision on proofs of debt must identify the specific decision under challenge and, where the 21-day time limit has expired, must include an application to extend time; a bare and unparticularised request for a general “review” of trustee administration is insufficient to enliven the Court’s jurisdiction.
- Courts may impose filing restriction orders under s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) where repeated pre-trial applications risk disrupting an imminent final hearing and causing unnecessary costs.
Why It Matters
This decision illustrates the limits of interlocutory practice in insolvency proceedings involving self-represented litigants with long litigation histories. Courts will not permit successive applications to relitigate settled questions — such as bias, leave to appeal, or interim injunctive relief — through fresh interlocutory filings, particularly where those applications are timed close to a substantive hearing and threaten to derail it. The decision also confirms that the s 104 review mechanism under the Bankruptcy Act has a strict procedural gateway: applicants must pinpoint the challenged decision and deal squarely with the limitation period.
The filing restriction order underscores the Court’s willingness to use its case management powers proactively to protect the integrity of scheduled hearings. For practitioners and trustees involved in prolonged bankruptcy disputes, the case is a reminder that courts will scrutinise last-minute interlocutory manoeuvres closely and may respond with prophylactic procedural controls where the pattern of conduct warrants it.