Background
Adam Leslie Troost retained Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd in complex family-law proceedings involving parenting issues and an asset pool estimated at $88 million to $117 million. The firm rendered 15 invoices totaling approximately $1.57 million. Troost later sought assessment of selected charges totaling $852,000.39, including charges for work performed by Wendy Cousens, an employee who was not a qualified legal practitioner.
The Costs Assessor allowed $275 per hour for the challenged items of Cousens’s work. On the firm’s review application, the Costs Assessment Review Panel concluded that the disclosed higher rates were fair and reasonable, finding that Cousens’s work was at a higher level than work ordinarily performed by a legal clerk. The Panel substituted an assessment totaling $760,142.58, including GST and disbursements. Troost appealed, but the parties ultimately accepted that the amount in dispute on appeal was below $100,000 and that leave was therefore required under s 89(1)(b) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW).
The Court’s Holding
Richardson J refused leave to appeal. The Court held that Troost had not identified an error of principle, a matter of public importance, or a reasonably clear injustice warranting appellate review. The fact that the disputed amount was said to be only slightly below the statutory threshold did not independently justify leave, nor did the fact that the substantive arguments had already been heard.
The proposed challenge lacked sufficient merit. An argument that Cousens had performed legal rather than financial-analysis work had not been advanced before the Review Panel and could not establish that the Panel erred by failing to address it. The Panel was not required to apply nonbinding guidelines concerning party-party costs to this solicitor-client assessment, and it was entitled to use its specialist expertise when evaluating Cousens’s work, experience, and disclosed rates. Nor was it legally impermissible for the Panel to consider that Troost had challenged Cousens’s hourly rate for only some work items. The summons was dismissed, and Troost was ordered to pay the firm’s costs.
Key Takeaways
- An appeal from a costs review panel under s 89 is by way of rehearing, not a hearing de novo; the appellant must demonstrate legal, factual, or discretionary error.
- Where less than $100,000 is in dispute, proximity to the statutory threshold does not itself justify leave to appeal.
- A review panel may use its specialist expertise to assess whether solicitor-client costs are fair and reasonable, and nonbinding guidelines for party-party costs do not control that assessment.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores the limited supervisory role of courts reviewing specialist costs assessments. A party seeking leave must identify more than a competing view about the appropriate hourly rate; the proposed appeal must reveal a sufficiently serious error or injustice.
It also highlights the importance of presenting objections fully before the Review Panel. A party generally cannot obtain appellate intervention based on a distinct argument that the Panel was never asked to decide.