Background
The plaintiffs brought dependency claims arising from the deaths of their partners, who were killed in a workplace accident in October 2016 when concrete panels crushed them at a construction site. The plaintiffs commenced proceedings three days after the relevant limitation period expired. The first defendant opposed a proposed extension of the limitation period, arguing it would suffer prejudice because it would be statute-barred from pursuing a third-party claim against the crane operator under the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld). The first defendant filed a separate third-party application seeking a declaration that it was not statute-barred and leave to issue a third-party claim. Both applications were heard together on 30 March 2026.
The plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledged that the delay in commencing proceedings was caused by the conduct of their former lawyers, not the plaintiffs themselves. The plaintiffs subsequently commenced a professional negligence claim against those lawyers to recover damages. Both the extension application and the third-party application hinged on questions about the appropriate balance of prejudice and causation.
The Court’s Holding
Cooper J dismissed the extension application, finding the plaintiffs had not demonstrated good reason to extend the limitation period. The court concluded that the prejudice the first defendant would suffer if the limitation period was extended would outweigh the prejudice the plaintiffs would suffer if the extension was refused. Additionally, the delay was attributable to the plaintiffs’ former lawyers’ conduct, not to any conscientious effort by the plaintiffs to comply with pre-trial requirements under the Personal Injuries Proceeding Act 2002 (Qld). Because the extension application was dismissed, the third-party application became moot and was also dismissed.
On costs, the court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the first defendant’s costs of the extension application, applying the general rule that costs follow the event. However, the plaintiffs were not ordered to pay the first defendant’s costs of the third-party application, as there was no “event” between the plaintiffs and the first defendant on that application. Importantly, the court declined to make a Sanderson or Bullock order requiring the plaintiffs to pay the proposed third party’s costs; instead, the first defendant must bear those costs itself. The court found that nothing the plaintiffs did caused the first defendant to bring the third-party application—the first defendant pursued it to advance its own interests.
Key Takeaways
- The general rule that “costs follow the event” applies when one party successfully resists an application, even if the unsuccessful party acted reasonably and the case presented finely balanced issues.
- A party’s impecuniosity is not ordinarily a relevant consideration in deciding whether to make a costs order, but it may justify the structure of an order (e.g., a stay) to prevent undue hardship and improve likelihood of compliance.
- A Bullock order (requiring one party to pay another party’s costs, with that party having a right to recover from a third party) will not be imposed where nothing the plaintiff did caused the defendant to incur those costs or make the third-party application.
- A costs order may be stayed in special or exceptional circumstances, including where a party will likely recover those costs through a pending professional negligence claim and faces genuine financial hardship.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the Queensland courts’ approach to costs orders in failed limitation-period extension applications and establishes important principles about when third-party costs should be shifted. Practitioners handling personal-injury claims should note that even reasonable attempts to extend a limitation period, where the underlying delay was caused by former solicitors, will typically result in a costs order against the plaintiff—though that cost may be recoverable in a professional negligence claim. The decision also confirms that impecuniosity, while not a standalone basis to avoid a costs order, can support a stay when a plaintiff has a realistic prospect of recovering those costs through another pending proceeding.
The judgment further refines the application of Bullock and Sanderson orders by emphasizing that the critical question is whether the unsuccessful defendant’s conduct (here, the plaintiffs’ conduct) caused the first defendant to incur third-party costs, not merely whether the first defendant acted reasonably. This narrows the circumstances in which a plaintiff can be saddled with a third party’s costs in defensive litigation.