Background
Three foster children—C.F. (age 6), E.F. (age 5), and S.F. (age 2)—entered the foster care system in April 2018 after their biological father left them unattended in a car for eleven hours. Alternative Family Services, Inc. (AFS), a foster family agency (FFA)—a nonprofit organization responsible for screening, approving, and supervising foster homes—approved the home of Mark and Marta Martinez for placement. The children were placed the next day. Over the following two months, foster father Mark Martinez sexually abused C.F. and E.F. on multiple occasions, and S.F. witnessed the abuse. Martinez ultimately pled guilty to two counts of sexual abuse.
The children sued AFS, alleging negligence in approving and supervising the Martinez home. At trial, plaintiffs presented evidence that AFS violated four CDSS licensing regulations: it failed to conduct separate individual interviews with each prospective foster parent; most interviews were held at AFS’s office rather than in the home; AFS failed to complete required psychosocial assessments—Mr. Martinez left nine of twenty-six screening questions blank, including questions about childhood sexual abuse, criminal history, and child pornography, which the agency never followed up on; and AFS failed to investigate Mr. Martinez’s mental health despite indications of personality changes and erratic behavior.
The jury returned a verdict of $24.7 million in damages, apportioning 60 percent of responsibility to AFS, 35 percent to the foster father, and 5 percent to the foster mother. AFS appealed, arguing that the trial court’s instructions improperly defined the scope of its duty of care and that the jury’s apportionment of fault was excessive.
The Court’s Holding
The central legal question on appeal was the scope of an FFA’s duty of care to the foster children it serves. AFS argued it should be liable only where it had actual knowledge that a foster parent posed a risk of sexual abuse. Plaintiffs countered that no limitation on the general duty of care was warranted. The Court of Appeal, applying the multi-factor balancing test from Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, rejected both positions. Under Rowland, courts evaluate whether policy considerations justify limiting the general duty of care by weighing: (1) the foreseeability of harm; (2) the degree of certainty the plaintiff suffered injury; (3) the closeness of connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury; (4) the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct; (5) the policy of preventing future harm; (6) the burden on the defendant; and (7) the availability of insurance. The court held that an FFA is liable where it knew or should have known of a risk of abuse—a constructive knowledge standard—rather than requiring actual knowledge or imposing unlimited liability.
The court found that while the trial court’s jury instructions were erroneous—they permitted the jury to find AFS liable without any showing that it knew or should have known of the specific risk posed by Martinez—the error was harmless. Given the extensive evidence that AFS failed to follow up on glaring red flags during screening, including unanswered questions about sexual abuse and criminal history and Mr. Martinez’s reported marital sexual conflict, no reasonable probability existed that a properly instructed jury would have reached a different verdict. The jury’s allocation of 60 percent fault to AFS itself demonstrated the panel found a strong causal link between AFS’s screening failures and the abuse.
The court also declined to disturb the jury’s apportionment of fault, citing precedent that a negligent tortfeasor may bear more responsibility than an intentional one where the negligent party’s duty was specifically to prevent the type of harm inflicted.
Key Takeaways
- Constructive knowledge standard for FFAs: A foster family agency’s duty of care to foster children is not limited to situations where it has actual knowledge of abuse risk. Under the Rowland balancing framework, an FFA is liable where it knew or should have known that a foster parent presented a risk of sexual abuse—a standard that requires the agency to exercise reasonable diligence in screening and supervision.
- Regulatory compliance is essential: AFS’s failure to comply with CDSS licensing regulations—including requirements for separate interviews, home-based interviews, and complete psychosocial assessments—was central to the jury’s finding of negligence. FFAs that cut corners in the approval process face significant exposure when those shortcuts are causally linked to a child’s harm.
- Fault apportionment can exceed the perpetrator’s share: Following Rosh v. Cave Imaging Systems (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1225, the court reaffirmed that a jury may assign a greater share of fault to a negligent screening entity than to the individual who committed the intentional abuse, particularly where the entity’s specific role was to prevent such harm.
Why It Matters
This opinion establishes a significant benchmark for foster family agency liability in California. By adopting a constructive knowledge standard—rather than requiring actual knowledge of abuse risk—the court signals that FFAs must exercise genuine diligence in their screening and supervisory functions, not merely rely on the absence of overt warning signs. For child welfare agencies and FFAs statewide, the decision underscores that regulatory compliance is not optional: CDSS licensing standards exist to protect vulnerable children, and failure to follow them can form the basis for substantial tort liability. The $24.7 million verdict, with 60 percent assigned to the FFA, illustrates the financial magnitude of that exposure.
For plaintiffs’ counsel in foster care abuse cases, the opinion provides a clear doctrinal framework grounded in constructive knowledge and regulatory violations. Defense counsel should note the court’s emphasis that liability requires more than general foreseeability—there must be evidence the FFA knew or should have known of a specific risk posed by a particular foster parent. The court also acknowledged that limited insurance availability for FFAs weighed in favor of the constructive knowledge standard rather than broader liability.