Marriage of Traweek — Domestic-violence conviction did not automatically bar spousal support

Case
Marriage of Traweek 8/28/26 CA2/8
Court
2nd District Court of Appeal
Judge
Maria E. Stratton (Edmund G. Brown Jr., 2018)
Date Decided
2026-08-28
Docket No.
B336738
Status
Reported / Citable
Topics
spousal support, domestic violence, Family Code section 4325, coercive control
Source
Mirrored from lexcalifornia.com

Background

After an 18-year marriage, Scott and Candice Traweek divorced. Candice had spent the marriage caring for the home and children rather than developing marketable employment skills, while Scott supported the family through his earnings. During the separation, Scott obtained a domestic violence restraining order against Candice, and she later was convicted of an offense that triggered Family Code section 4325.

Section 4325 creates a rebuttable presumption against awarding spousal support to a spouse convicted of domestic violence against the other spouse within five years before the dissolution filing or during the case. The trial court nevertheless awarded Candice limited support. It found the presumption rebutted after considering the long marriage, her financial dependence, her care of the children, the parties’ broader history, and evidence that Scott had exercised coercive financial control. The court denied retroactive support and overtime-based support and imposed a nonmodifiable termination date.

The Court’s Holding

The Court of Appeal affirmed. It held that section 4325’s direction to consider what is just and equitable permits a family court to evaluate the entire marital context, including the usual spousal-support factors in Family Code section 4320 and documented domestic violence by either party. Earlier authority saying section 4320 factors need not be considered applies when the convicted spouse fails to rebut the presumption; it does not prevent consideration of those factors when deciding whether the presumption has been rebutted.

The trial judge did not abuse her discretion. The record supported findings that Candice lacked present earning capacity after devoting the marriage to domestic work, continued to support children living with her, and faced destitution without transitional support. The court also could consider Scott’s own conduct, including financial control recognized by statute as a form of coercive control. The carefully limited award gave meaningful weight to the domestic-violence policy without treating the presumption as an absolute ban.

Key Takeaways

  • A section 4325 domestic-violence conviction creates a presumption against support, not a categorical prohibition.
  • The court may consider the full section 4320 picture, including marriage length, earning capacity, caregiving, need, and domestic violence by either spouse.
  • Evidence of coercive financial control can matter even when the spouse seeking support is the person whose conviction triggered the presumption.
  • Tailoring the amount, duration, retroactivity, and modifiability of support can reconcile the competing policies of deterring abuse and avoiding an inequitable economic result.

Why It Matters

Family-law practitioners should build or oppose a section 4325 rebuttal with a complete factual record rather than treating the conviction as dispositive. The decision gives trial courts substantial equitable room, but a successful order should expressly acknowledge the presumption, address the relevant evidence, and explain how limitations on support reflect the seriousness of domestic violence.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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