Background
Alfred Eugene Shallowhorn was convicted in 2001 of three counts of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder arising from a December 2, 1995 gang-related shooting in which three young people were killed. The jury was instructed on three theories of murder: that he directly and actively committed the murders, that he was a direct aider and abettor, and that he perpetrated the murders by discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle with intent to kill. The jury was not instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine or felony murder as to the murder counts, although the conspiracy instruction (CALJIC No. 6.11) contained natural and probable consequences language. The trial court sentenced him to three consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole plus 33 years for firearm enhancements.
On December 17, 2020, Shallowhorn filed a first petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, enacted by Senate Bill No. 1437 to allow relief for defendants convicted under now-invalid theories of imputed malice. The trial court summarily denied that petition on January 13, 2021, finding the jury was not instructed on natural and probable consequences or felony murder, and the Court of Appeal affirmed in 2021. On September 12, 2024, Shallowhorn filed a second petition. The trial court appointed counsel, the People filed an opposition, and at a prima facie hearing on October 6, 2025, the parties submitted on their briefs and the court concluded he was ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Shallowhorn is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because his record of conviction conclusively establishes that the jury found he personally acted with malice. All three murder theories presented to the jury—that he was the actual killer, that he directly aided and abetted the actual killer, or that he engaged in a drive-by shooting with the intent to kill—required a finding that he himself acted with malice, and the jury was not instructed on any theory of imputed malice. The natural and probable consequences language in the conspiracy instruction did not create a loophole, particularly because the jury was instructed to decide each count separately.
The court rejected Shallowhorn's reliance on People v. McCoy, which does not support his position, and distinguished People v. Curiel, where the jury was instructed on natural and probable consequences, and People v. Morris, which concerned felony murder. The court reaffirmed, citing People v. Bland, that the law speaks in terms of intent to kill a person, not the specific person intended to be killed, so aiding and abetting the murder of unintended victims does not negate murderous intent. The court also rejected his reliance on People v. Sealie, an unpublished decision reversing the denial of his codefendant's petition, because the Sealie jury was instructed on imputed-malice theories for the murder counts while Shallowhorn's jury was not.
Key Takeaways
- A defendant is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 when the record of conviction establishes that every murder theory presented to the jury required a finding of personal malice and no imputed-malice theory was given.
- Natural and probable consequences language in a conspiracy instruction does not undermine murder convictions where the murder instructions required personal malice and the jury was instructed to decide each count separately.
- Direct aiding and abetting liability for murder requires the aider and abettor to know and share the perpetrator's murderous intent, and that intent is not negated when the actual victims were not the intended targets.
- A codefendant's appellate success does not support reversal where the codefendant's jury received materially different instructions on imputed-malice theories that were not given to the petitioner's jury.
- Whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6 is a purely legal issue subject to de novo review.
Why It Matters
This unpublished decision applies section 1172.6's prima facie standard to a second resentencing petition, confirming that when the record of conviction conclusively forecloses the possibility that the defendant was convicted on an invalid theory, the trial court may deny relief as a matter of law after appointing counsel and holding a hearing.
It also illustrates the limits of conspiracy-instruction challenges following Senate Bill No. 1437: natural and probable consequences language in a conspiracy instruction does not by itself show that a murder conviction rested on an invalid theory when the murder instructions themselves required personal malice.
Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket