Background
Sarbjeet Maan sued his brother, Gauravjeet “Rav” Maan, Maan Made Enterprises Ltd., and others over a family property-development venture. Sarbjeet alleged that he and Rav had agreed to operate the company together and share ownership and profits equally, but that Rav removed him as a director, withheld profits, and fraudulently transferred two development lots to relatives. The action also alleged conspiracy and false imprisonment. The defendants denied the material allegations, including the existence of the alleged partnership and incorporation agreements.
Sarbjeet commenced the action in July 2019. A trial scheduled for July 2021 was adjourned, and the case later remained dormant for an extended period before Sarbjeet served a document list and sought further disclosure in December 2024. The appellants applied in February 2025 to dismiss the action for want of prosecution, alleging prejudice from the death of a corporate lawyer, another witness’s failing memory, missing documents, and the litigation’s effects on Rav. The chambers judge found approximately four and a half years of cumulative delay to be inordinate and inexcusable but concluded that the interests of justice favored deciding the case on its merits.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It held that the chambers judge correctly articulated and applied the three-part framework from Giacomini Consulting Canada Inc. v The Owners, Strata Plan EPS 3173. Once inordinate and inexcusable delay is established, the court must holistically assess whether the interests of justice permit the action to proceed. There is no presumption or shifted onus requiring dismissal unless the plaintiff supplies an overwhelming reason to continue. Prejudice remains important, but it is one factor in the broader analysis rather than a prerequisite or overriding consideration.
The chambers judge was entitled to reject the appellants’ asserted prejudice. The deceased lawyer was an important witness primarily for Sarbjeet, whose case was weakened by having to rely on hearsay against three defendants’ firsthand accounts. The judge was not obliged to infer broader memory prejudice that the appellants had not argued below. She also committed no reversible error in addressing the seriousness of the allegations or Rav’s claimed health and employment effects, because medical causation required proper opinion evidence and the limited nurse-practitioner evidence would not have changed the overall interests-of-justice balance.
Key Takeaways
- Inordinate and inexcusable delay does not create a presumption or shift the onus in favor of dismissal; courts must balance all relevant interests-of-justice factors.
- Prejudice to a defendant’s ability to defend remains important, but it is neither a standalone requirement nor the overriding consideration under the revised test.
- A party alleging health or employment harm caused by litigation stress may need admissible expert evidence to establish medical causation.
Why It Matters
The decision clarifies British Columbia’s revised approach to dismissal for want of prosecution. Even after serious, unjustified delay is established, dismissal is not automatic: the applicant must persuade the court that the interests of justice justify depriving the plaintiff of the presumptive entitlement to a decision on the merits.
For litigators, the ruling underscores the importance of presenting concrete evidence of prejudice and raising each claimed form of harm before the chambers judge. It also confirms that defendants’ own inactivity during a prolonged delay may weigh against dismissal, even though defendants have no obligation to advance the plaintiff’s case.