Background
At about 4 a.m. on December 15, 2019, Gerassimos Maniatis was found in the driver’s seat of his vehicle after it struck a Toronto streetlight. The vehicle was not running, its hazard lights were on, and its airbags had deployed. Police observed signs of alcohol consumption, and breath samples showed a blood-alcohol concentration over the legal limit. Maniatis said an acquaintance had been driving, fled after the collision, and that he entered the driver’s seat only afterward.
Maniatis was charged with impaired operation under s. 320.14 of the Criminal Code. The trial judge found the vehicle was inoperable when Maniatis was found in it and was largely off the travelled road, creating no realistic risk of danger. The judge held those facts rebutted the s. 320.35 presumption that a person in the driver’s seat was operating the vehicle, and acquitted him. A summary conviction appeal judge allowed the Crown’s appeal and ordered a new trial.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal dismissed Maniatis’s appeal. Section 320.35 provides that proof an accused occupied the driver’s seat creates a presumption of operation unless the accused establishes that they did not occupy it for the purpose of setting the vehicle in motion. Its text specifies that rebuttal route and does not permit rebuttal merely by showing the vehicle was inoperable or posed no realistic risk of danger.
The court accepted that a realistic risk of danger is ordinarily an essential element of care or control. But Parliament enacted the statutory presumption to discourage intoxicated people from placing themselves in a position to move a vehicle and to relieve the Crown of proving certain elements of care or control. That purpose, together with the provision’s plain language, supported applying the presumption even where the vehicle was inoperable when the accused was discovered. The court remitted the matter to the Ontario Court of Justice for a new trial.
Key Takeaways
- Under s. 320.35, an accused in the driver’s seat must show they did not occupy it for the purpose of setting the vehicle in motion to rebut the presumption of operation.
- Inoperability and an absence of realistic danger do not independently rebut that presumption.
- The appeal decided statutory interpretation only; it did not determine a constitutional challenge to s. 320.35.
Why It Matters
The decision resolves an Ontario appellate question on the scope of s. 320.35 and rejects lower-court authority treating vehicle inoperability or lack of danger as an additional rebuttal ground. For impaired-operation cases, the focus at the presumption stage is the accused’s purpose in occupying the driver’s position, not whether the vehicle could then be moved or was dangerous.