Background
On July 2, 2022, Renzo Gomez accelerated his Corvette to 164 km/h in a 60 km/h zone in an attempt to beat a yellow light. He entered the intersection on a red light and struck a turning vehicle, killing the passenger and seriously injuring the driver. The conduct was not an isolated lapse: moments before the collision, Gomez had cut off another vehicle and floored his engine while lane-changing to pass slower traffic.
Gomez had a significant Highway Traffic Act record, including a ticket for travelling 168 km/h in a 100 km/h zone just three months before the fatal crash. An illegal radar detector was found in his vehicle at the time of the accident. He had also consumed alcohol earlier that evening, though he was acquitted of impaired driving.
Gomez pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm. At sentencing before Justice Ricchetti of the Superior Court of Justice, the Crown sought 8 years’ imprisonment while the defence sought a conditional sentence. The sentencing judge imposed 6 years for the causing-death count and 4 years for the causing-bodily-harm count, to be served concurrently, plus a 16-year driving prohibition.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, upholding the 6-year concurrent sentence. Writing for a panel of Rouleau, Wilson, and Madsen JJ.A., the court held that the sentencing judge committed no error in principle and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit — the standard required for appellate intervention under R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64.
The court rejected each ground of appeal. It confirmed that the sentencing judge was entitled to treat Gomez’s alcohol consumption as aggravating notwithstanding the acquittal on impaired driving, to assign minimal weight to the guilty pleas given their lateness, and to draw the conclusions he did from the psychological report — which showed remorse but also a lack of insight into personal responsibility. The weight assigned to mitigating and aggravating factors is quintessentially a matter for the sentencing judge.
The court also reaffirmed, following R. v. Georgopoulos, 2026 ONCA 27, and R. v. Robertson, 2026 ONCA 281, that prior sentencing precedents must be approached with caution in light of Parliament’s decision to increase maximum penalties for dangerous driving offences. A sentence is not demonstrably unfit merely because it is unprecedented, particularly when it responds to that legislative increase.
Key Takeaways
- Appellate courts will not intervene in a dangerous driving sentence absent a demonstrable error in principle or a manifestly unfit result; the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors belongs to the sentencing judge.
- Alcohol consumption may be treated as an aggravating factor even where the accused was acquitted of impaired driving, and late guilty pleas may receive minimal mitigating weight.
- Sentencing precedents for dangerous driving offences must be applied cautiously following Parliament’s elevation of the maximum penalties; a sentence that appears unprecedented is not automatically unfit.
- Conduct revealing a pattern of disregard for road safety rules — prior speeding convictions, an illegal radar detector, aggressive driving immediately before the fatal collision — will support a significant custodial term.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the elevated sentencing range available for dangerous driving causing death in the wake of Parliament’s legislative amendments, and signals that Ontario courts will apply substantial deference to trial judges who craft sentences that reflect the gravity of egregious road conduct. Defence counsel should not expect a conditional sentence or a sentence at the lower end of historical ranges where the offender demonstrates a pattern of dangerous behaviour rather than a single lapse in judgment.
The case also clarifies that a psychological report tendered in mitigation will carry limited weight where it simultaneously reveals a lack of offender insight — and that an appellate court will not second-guess how a sentencing judge weighs such a report absent a misapprehension of its contents.