Background
Stephanie Molloy was convicted of criminal negligence causing bodily harm under s. 221 of the Criminal Code after her one-year-old daughter nearly died from ingesting methamphetamines and fentanyl while in Molloy’s care at the family home. Drug paraphernalia and pills — including new and used needles, at least one testing positive for fentanyl — had been present throughout the home for an extended period, creating an inherently dangerous environment for the infant.
On November 28, 2025, Justice Julie Bourgeois of the Ontario Court of Justice sentenced Molloy to 32 months’ incarceration, less credit of 237 days for pre-trial custody. The sentencing judge had before her a Gladue report, a Gladue letter, a psychiatric assessment, and a pre-sentence report, and she considered mitigating factors related to Molloy’s difficult life circumstances. Nonetheless, she concluded that the principles of denunciation and deterrence, which take priority under s. 718.01 of the Criminal Code in offences involving child victims, required the custodial term imposed.
Molloy appealed, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to the principle of restraint in crafting the sentence. She appeared in person with the assistance of duty counsel. The conviction appeal was abandoned at her request.
The Court’s Holding
A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeal for Ontario (George, Monahan, and Pomerance JJ.A.) granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge’s analysis. The court affirmed that the sentencing judge properly applied the statutory framework, including s. 718.01 of the Criminal Code, which directs that denunciation and deterrence be given primary consideration in offences involving the abuse of persons under 18.
The court endorsed the sentencing judge’s reliance on R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, which underscores the gravity of offences causing harm to children and the heightened moral culpability that attaches when a child is wholly dependent on an adult for safety. The panel emphasized that the infant was entirely powerless and that both Molloy and her then-spouse had failed in their fundamental duty to provide a safe living environment. The 32-month sentence, less pre-trial credit, was upheld in its entirety.
Key Takeaways
- Courts must give primacy to denunciation and deterrence under s. 718.01 of the Criminal Code when the victim is a child, even where significant Gladue and mitigating factors are present.
- The Supreme Court of Canada’s framework in R. v. Friesen applies beyond sexual offences to any criminal negligence causing serious harm to a dependent child.
- Prolonged exposure of a child to a drug-laden home environment — not merely a single incident of negligence — was central to the court’s assessment of the gravity of the offence.
- A sentencing judge’s consideration of a Gladue report and other mitigating evidence does not guarantee a reduced sentence where countervailing principles are sufficiently weighty.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that Canadian sentencing courts will not subordinate child protection to the principle of restraint, even for Indigenous offenders whose Gladue circumstances are fully documented and considered. Defence counsel should expect that where a dependent child suffers serious harm due to a caregiver’s sustained negligence, the sentencing judge’s discretion will be significantly constrained by ss. 718.01 and the Friesen framework.
The case also illustrates the appellate courts’ reluctance to disturb sentences in child-victim cases absent a clear error in principle. For prosecutors and child welfare practitioners, it signals that persistent household drug hazards — not just a discrete harmful act — can independently support findings of the degree of moral culpability necessary to justify substantial custodial terms.