Background
R.B.-C. was found guilty of sexual assault in October 2021. Sentencing began immediately but was prolonged by transcript requests, technical difficulties, unavailable judges and counsel, and repeated requests for information about the immigration consequences of possible sentences. More than 14 months after conviction, the trial judge rejected R.B.-C.’s application to stay the proceedings for unreasonable delay and imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by one year of probation.
The Ontario Court of Appeal recalculated the delay under its five-month presumptive ceiling for post-verdict sentencing delay and found a breach of section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It declined to stay the proceedings, instead reducing the conditional sentence to 20 months. R.B.-C. appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. It held that section 11(b) protects the right to be sentenced within a reasonable time, but rejected a fixed five-month presumptive ceiling for post-verdict sentencing delay and overruled the Ontario Court of Appeal’s contrary approach in R. v. Charley. Courts must instead ask whether sentencing took markedly longer than it reasonably should have in all the circumstances. Relevant considerations include the total duration, the proceeding’s complexity, the reasons for particular periods of delay, the parties’ conduct, and timelines in comparable local cases, without treating systemic under-resourcing as constitutionally acceptable.
Although the Court of Appeal applied the wrong test, the Supreme Court agreed that the sentencing process here was markedly longer than reasonably necessary. The immigration issue was not unusually complex and was handled incrementally without an effective timetable. The ordinary remedy for unconstitutional post-verdict delay is a sentence reduction under section 24(1), not an automatic stay; a stay remains possible only in exceptional cases. The 20-month conditional sentence was a proper and proportionate remedy.
Key Takeaways
- There is no fixed presumptive ceiling for delay between conviction and sentencing; the Jordan trial-delay ceilings do not govern that period.
- A section 11(b) breach occurs when sentencing takes markedly longer than it reasonably should have under an objective, contextual assessment.
- A sentence reduction will ordinarily remedy unconstitutional sentencing delay, while a stay of proceedings is reserved for exceptional cases.
Why It Matters
The decision establishes a nationwide framework for evaluating post-verdict sentencing delay and replaces Ontario’s five-month ceiling with a flexible, fact-specific test. It recognizes the variable information needed for a fit sentence while requiring courts and counsel to manage sentencing efficiently.
The ruling also clarifies that remedies differ before and after conviction. Because post-verdict delay does not taint a valid finding of guilt, courts should generally tailor relief to the sentence rather than terminate the case.