Background
James William Scot Thomson and Jill Anne Fleming are parties to a family proceeding involving their 13-year-old child. In May 2024, as part of a final consent order, they entered into a Parenting Coordination Agreement that granted the parenting coordinator arbitral authority over certain parenting issues. In May 2025, the parenting coordinator issued an award expressly directing Thomson to take all steps necessary to obtain the child’s passport and to confirm to the coordinator that the matter had been resolved.
Despite that award, Thomson obstructed the passport application. Fleming brought an enforcement motion before the Superior Court of Justice in August 2025, seeking an order dispensing with Thomson’s participation in the passport application and permitting her to travel internationally with the child without his consent. The child is described as an accomplished athlete who requires a passport for international sport-related travel.
Justice Derstine of the Superior Court granted the relief sought on August 22, 2025, waiving Thomson’s participation in the passport application and his consent to travel. Thomson appealed, arguing the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction because the parties’ Parenting Coordination Agreement vested authority over these issues in the parenting coordinator, and that Fleming had not brought a proper arbitration enforcement proceeding.
The Court’s Holding
A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeal (Thorburn, Madsen, and Rahman JJ.A.) dismissed the appeal as without merit. The court held that the motion judge properly characterized Fleming’s motion as an enforcement motion — one seeking to give effect to the parenting coordinator’s existing award requiring Thomson to facilitate the passport — rather than a fresh arbitration of a disputed parenting issue. As such, the Superior Court had full authority to act.
The court confirmed that rule 32.1(2) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, authorizes a judge to make an enforcement order in these circumstances, including the ancillary relief of dispensing with Thomson’s consent to travel, which the motion judge found was also necessary to give the enforcement order practical effect. The appellant’s argument that all relief had to flow through the parenting coordinator was rejected.
Key Takeaways
- A court retains jurisdiction to enforce a parenting coordinator’s award even where a Parenting Coordination Agreement grants the coordinator arbitral authority; a party need not re-arbitrate when seeking enforcement of an existing award.
- Rule 32.1(2) of Ontario’s Family Law Rules provides a clear statutory basis for enforcement orders, including ancillary relief such as dispensing with a parent’s consent to a child’s travel where obstruction is established.
- A parent who defies a parenting coordinator’s award directing cooperation on a passport application risks a court order entirely removing their participation from the process.
- Costs consequences follow obstruction: Thomson faced a $2,500 appeal costs award on top of a $3,500 unpaid costs order from the motion below.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the relationship between parenting coordination regimes and court enforcement powers in Ontario. Parties who agree to parenting coordination with arbitral authority do not thereby immunize themselves from court enforcement when they defy an award — the Superior Court retains the power to step in and give the award teeth, including by removing an obstructing parent from the process altogether.
For family law practitioners, the case reinforces that enforcement motions under r. 32.1(2) are an effective and jurisdictionally sound remedy when one party stonewalls a parenting coordinator’s direction. It also signals that courts will not allow procedural arguments about the scope of arbitral authority to shield a parent from accountability for conduct that harms a child’s practical interests — here, participation in international athletic competition.