Background
In January 2024, Siyi Wang attempted to open a joint chequing account with Motus Bank, a virtual bank. Motus Bank required the Social Insurance Number (SIN) of both the primary and secondary joint accountholders before opening such an account. Wang declined to provide the secondary accountholder’s SIN and was consequently refused the account. After exchanges with Motus Bank’s Member Concerns Officer, Wang was told that the SIN requirement existed because Motus Bank offers only interest-bearing deposit products — triggering tax-reporting obligations — and because the right of survivorship applies to joint accounts, making retroactive SIN collection impractical.
Wang filed a complaint with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC), arguing that requiring a SIN for a joint chequing account was an unnecessary and coercive collection of personal information contrary to PIPEDA. The OPC issued its report on July 21, 2025, finding the complaint “not well-founded” and concluding that Motus Bank had provided a fair and reasonable response. Wang then applied to the Federal Court under subsection 14(1) of PIPEDA for a de novo hearing of the matter.
Wang, self-represented, argued that clause 4.3.3 of Schedule 1 to PIPEDA — which prohibits organizations from conditioning a product or service on consent to collect information beyond what is required for legitimate, explicitly specified purposes — was violated by Motus Bank’s insistence on collecting the secondary accountholder’s SIN as a prerequisite to opening the account.
The Court’s Holding
Justice D’Agostino dismissed the application. Conducting the required de novo review of Motus Bank’s conduct (owing no deference to the OPC report), the Court found that Wang had not met his burden of establishing, on a balance of probabilities through clear, convincing, and cogent evidence, that Motus Bank breached PIPEDA. The Court confirmed it had jurisdiction over the application, rejecting Motus Bank’s mootness and jurisdictional arguments, but concluded those arguments were ultimately beside the point given the evidentiary failure.
Wang’s core contention — that collection of the secondary accountholder’s SIN was not legally required and therefore unnecessary — was unsupported by compelling evidence. Motus Bank’s Privacy Policy, in evidence before the Court, explained that SINs are collected for tax-reporting purposes on interest-generating products, for credit-bureau reporting, and for customer identity verification. The Court noted that while Wang provided extensive correspondence reflecting his disagreement with the policy, those communications did not substantiate an actual breach. No costs were awarded.
Key Takeaways
- A PIPEDA subsection 14(1) application requires a de novo review by the Federal Court — no deference is owed to the Privacy Commissioner’s findings — but the applicant bears the burden of proving a breach by clear, convincing, and cogent evidence.
- Being self-represented does not lower the standard of proof; a self-represented litigant must still put forward their case with sufficient evidence.
- A financial institution’s policy of collecting SINs from all joint accountholders can be defensible under PIPEDA where the institution offers only interest-bearing products and has documented tax-reporting and right-of-survivorship justifications.
- Extensive correspondence expressing disagreement with a respondent’s policy does not, without more, constitute evidence of a PIPEDA breach.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the evidentiary demands placed on PIPEDA complainants who seek Federal Court review after an unfavourable OPC report. It clarifies that the de novo standard, while freeing the Court from deference to the Commissioner, does not lower the applicant’s burden — if anything, it underscores that the Court will scrutinize the record independently and dismiss applications that rest on assertion rather than proof. For financial institutions, the case offers some comfort that clearly articulated, business-driven SIN collection policies tied to statutory tax-reporting obligations can withstand PIPEDA challenge when accompanied by robust privacy safeguards and transparent disclosure.
The decision also touches on the scope of standing under subsection 14(1), confirming that a complainant may bring an application even where the personal information at issue belongs to a third party (here, the secondary accountholder), so long as the OPC report has been completed. This standing point, consistent with earlier Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal authority, may encourage similar complaints from individuals objecting to collection practices that affect others in a shared transaction.