Yilmaz v. Dhugga — Court upholds solicitor’s lien on settlement reached after lawyer withdrew

Case
Yilmaz v. Dhugga
Court
Court of Appeal for British Columbia (Canada)
Judge
Honourable Justice MacNaughton (Minister of Justice and Attorney General Arif Virani (Government of Canada), 2025)
Date Decided
June 15, 2026
Citation
2026 BCCA 277
Topics
Solicitor’s lien, Legal Profession Act, contingency fees, personal injury
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

In December 2020, Ozgur Yilmaz retained the law firm Mussio Goodman LLP (MG) and lawyer Eric Goodman on a 30% contingency fee basis to pursue claims arising from an October 2019 accident. MG acted as solicitor of record for approximately five years. In February 2025, Goodman withdrew from the representation for cause after a dispute with Yilmaz over settlement strategy. Three months after MG’s withdrawal, Yilmaz settled his personal injury claim directly with the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (ICBC).

Following the settlement, MG filed a solicitor’s lien under s. 79 of the Legal Profession Act, S.B.C. 1998, c. 9 (LPA), asserting a charge against the settlement funds for its fees and disbursements. Yilmaz applied to the Supreme Court of British Columbia to strike the lien, arguing that because no settlement existed at the time MG withdrew, no property had been “recovered or preserved” to which the charge could attach. The chambers judge dismissed the application on January 28, 2026, finding that the conditions of s. 79 were met and that any dispute about quantum was a matter for the registrar.

Yilmaz appealed to the Court of Appeal, appearing in person by videoconference. He raised four grounds of alleged legal error, principally that the chambers judge failed to address the threshold question of whether MG had actually recovered or preserved property, and that the cases relied upon below did not support the lien’s validity.

The Court’s Holding

The Court of Appeal, in oral reasons delivered by Justice MacNaughton (Riley and Brundrett JJ.A. concurring), dismissed the appeal. The court confirmed that s. 79(1) of the LPA imposes only two requirements before a solicitor’s charge can be assessed by a registrar: (1) the lawyer was retained to prosecute or defend a proceeding, and (2) property was recovered or preserved as a result of that proceeding. There is no additional requirement that the lawyer demonstrate a precise causal connection between their specific work and the recovery of settlement funds, nor is it necessary that a settlement be in place at the time the retainer is terminated.

The court reaffirmed its earlier decision in FitzGibbon v. Piters, 2012 BCCA 269, which held that a solicitor’s charge is an inchoate right that crystallizes upon recovery, and that a law firm that withdrew before a subsequent lawyer negotiated the settlement was nonetheless entitled to a lien on those settlement proceeds. Yilmaz’s argument — that no charge can attach if there is no settlement when the retainer ends — was held to be irreconcilable with FitzGibbon. The court also distinguished Hosseini v. Oreck Chernoff, 1999 BCCA 386, explaining that that case addressed a solicitor’s attempt to charge property awarded to the opposing party, not a situation where a lawyer withdrew before settlement.

Questions concerning the degree to which MG’s work contributed to the final settlement, the quality of that work, the scope of the contingency fee agreement (including whether it extended to Part 7 benefits), and the quantum of fees and disbursements were all held to be matters properly before the registrar rather than the court on an application to discharge the lien.

Key Takeaways

  • A solicitor’s lien under s. 79 of the LPA can attach to a settlement reached after the lawyer has withdrawn, provided the lawyer was retained to prosecute the proceeding and property was ultimately recovered as a result of that proceeding.
  • There is no requirement under s. 79(1) that a settlement exist at the time of the retainer’s termination, nor that the solicitor prove a precise causal link between their individual work and the ultimate recovery.
  • Disputes about fee quantum, work quality, the contribution of the lawyer’s efforts to the result, and the scope of a contingency fee agreement are for the registrar to resolve — not a basis to discharge the lien at the application stage.
  • A client cannot defeat a solicitor’s lien simply by dismissing their lawyer and then settling independently; doing so on the eve of settlement would otherwise allow clients to avoid paying earned fees.

Why It Matters

This decision reinforces the robustness of the solicitor’s lien in British Columbia as a mechanism protecting counsel who work on contingency. By confirming that the charge is inchoate and crystallizes upon recovery — regardless of whether the retainer was still active at settlement — the court closes a potential loophole that could otherwise be exploited by clients who discharge their lawyers shortly before a settlement is finalized. Lawyers practising personal injury litigation on contingency can take some comfort that their fee interests survive termination of the retainer.

For clients and their new counsel, the decision signals that the quantum and fairness of the former solicitor’s claim remains fully contestable before the registrar, where issues of work quality, contribution to outcome, and the proper scope of the retainer can be examined. The registrar process, not a summary application to discharge, is the appropriate forum for those substantive disputes.

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