Background
Colby Craft pleaded guilty to illegal discharge of a firearm as an act of domestic violence after being charged with attempted first degree assault arising from a domestic violence incident. In exchange, the prosecution dismissed the attempted-assault charge and Craft received an eighteen-month deferred judgment and sentence conditioned on his successful completion of probation.
Six months before the deferral period ended, Craft’s probation officer filed a complaint and special report alleging probation violations. Seventeen days after the period ended, the district attorney moved to revoke the deferred judgment based on the same alleged violations. After finding that Craft had committed a new offense, the district court revoked the deferred judgment and entered a conviction.
The Court’s Holding
The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that the deferred-judgment agreement did not require the district attorney to seek revocation before the deferral period expired; the agreement specified no filing deadline.
Colorado’s deferred-judgment statute permits a district attorney or probation officer to apply for entry of judgment within the deferral term or within thirty-five days afterward. Because the district attorney filed the revocation motion seventeen days after the term ended, the district court retained authority to consider it. The court also rejected Craft’s argument that the deferred judgment expired by operation of law and his related due-process claim.
Key Takeaways
- A deferred-judgment agreement will not be read to impose a filing deadline it does not state.
- Under section 18-1.3-102(2), a revocation application may be filed up to thirty-five days after the deferral period ends.
- A timely post-expiration revocation motion preserves the trial court’s authority to enter judgment and sentence.
Why It Matters
The decision confirms that the statutory thirty-five-day post-deferral window applies where a deferred-judgment agreement does not set a different deadline. Defendants and counsel should therefore distinguish between expiration of the supervision period and expiration of the court’s statutory authority to hear a timely revocation application.