Background
In September 2023, the Chaffee County Department of Human Services received a report of domestic violence and found that the mother, N.L.D., was too intoxicated to care for the child C.N.T. The father, W.C.T., was in jail. The Department removed the child and filed a petition in dependency or neglect. Both parents admitted the child was in an injurious environment, and the juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected. The court adopted treatment plans requiring both parents to address substance use, domestic violence, parenting skills, and housing stability.
By February 2025, neither parent had complied with the treatment plans. The guardian ad litem (GAL) — a court-appointed attorney charged with representing the child’s best interests — filed a motion to terminate both parents’ parental rights. The Department did not object. After an evidentiary hearing in June 2025, the juvenile court granted the motion and entered a judgment terminating both parent-child relationships. Both parents appealed, arguing principally that the GAL lacked standing to file the termination motion.
The parents relied on the Colorado Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in People in Interest of R.M.P., 2025 CO 34, which held that only the State has standing to initiate and prosecute a dependency or neglect proceeding under the State’s parens patriae authority. The parents argued this meant only the Department — not the GAL — could move for termination.
The Court’s Holding
The court affirmed the judgment and held that R.M.P. does not prevent a GAL from filing a motion to terminate parental rights. Two independent grounds support this conclusion.
First, R.M.P. is limited to the adjudicatory phase. A dependency or neglect case has two distinct phases. In the first — the adjudicatory phase — the State files a petition and the court determines whether the child is dependent or neglected. R.M.P. holds that the State alone has standing to initiate and pursue this phase, because parens patriae authority belongs to the State. But the second — the dispositional phase — begins only after adjudication and concerns how to address the dependency finding, including through treatment plans and, ultimately, termination. The court concluded that R.M.P.‘s reasoning and holding address the State’s power to initiate and pursue the petition to adjudication; they do not address standing in the dispositional phase that follows. A motion to terminate is a dispositional motion, not a new proceeding requiring the State’s parens patriae initiation authority.
Second, the GAL has independent statutory authority. Section 19-3-203(5), C.R.S. 2025, charges a GAL to act as an independent advocate for the child’s best interests — not merely as a passive participant. This independent statutory mandate gives the GAL standing to seek any relief that serves the child’s best interests in the dispositional phase, including termination. The court emphasized that restricting GALs to only supporting positions the Department has already taken would undermine the protective function the legislature assigned to them.
Key Takeaways
- The Colorado Supreme Court’s holding in People in Interest of R.M.P. (2025) — that only the State can initiate and prosecute a dependency or neglect proceeding — applies only to the adjudicatory (first) phase, not to the dispositional (second) phase of the case.
- A guardian ad litem has independent standing, grounded in section 19-3-203(5), to file a motion for termination of parental rights in the dispositional phase, even without the Department joining the motion.
- The decision preserves the GAL’s role as an independent voice for the child’s best interests throughout the proceeding, not just during adjudication.
- Judge J. Jones’s dubitante concurrence — concurring in the result but expressing doubt about the majority’s reasoning — signals ongoing uncertainty in how courts will apply R.M.P. going forward.
Why It Matters
This decision has practical significance for child welfare practitioners throughout Colorado. In many cases, the Department may be reluctant to pursue termination — whether due to resource constraints, policy considerations, or disagreement with the GAL about the child’s best interests. The ruling confirms that in such situations, the GAL can act independently and move for termination if that is what the child’s best interests require, without waiting for the Department to take the lead.
For attorneys representing parents in dependency proceedings, the decision means that a termination motion does not become legally defective simply because it was filed by the GAL rather than the Department. Defenses will need to be directed at the merits — the sufficiency of the evidence for termination — not at the GAL’s standing to raise the issue. The dubitante concurrence by Judge Jones is worth watching, as it may signal that R.M.P.‘s reach will be tested again in future cases raising standing questions in the dispositional phase.