People in Interest of T.K.W. — Colorado Court of Appeals affirms juvenile delinquency adjudication for menacing and attempted extreme indifference assault

Case
The People of the State of Colorado in the Interest of T.K.W.
Court
Colorado Court of Appeals, Division II
Date Decided
June 18, 2026
Docket No.
23CA1807
Topics
Juvenile Delinquency, Sufficiency of Evidence, Menacing, Complicity

Background

T.K.W., a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent following a jury trial in Chaffee County arising from two criminal incidents that occurred minutes apart in the same neighborhood. In the first, T.K.W. and a companion, C.R., went to an apartment where a couple in their extended friend group lived. While both wore masks and hoods, one brandished a gun, pounded on the door, and ordered the occupants to come outside — sending a video of the encounter over social media. The couple, having received prior text threats, fled before the confrontation and later identified T.K.W. as the masked individual in the black hoodie holding the gun. C.R. subsequently pleaded guilty to menacing and admitted his intent was to scare the male occupant.

In the second incident, as T.K.W., C.R., and a friend named R.B. walked away from the apartment, T.K.W. told C.R. about a recent dispute in which his girlfriend’s neighbors had allegedly used a racial slur. The group, collectively in possession of two guns, approached the neighbors’ house. T.K.W. and C.R. told R.B. to run; moments later, thirteen or fourteen shots were fired at the house. That night, T.K.W. texted a photo of the house to a friend with the caption “I think someone got murdled” and two laughing emojis. C.R. later pleaded guilty to illegal discharge of a firearm and received a prison sentence.

A jury found T.K.W. guilty of two counts of misdemeanor menacing and one count of attempted first degree extreme indifference assault, while specifically finding he did not personally use a firearm. The juvenile court adjudicated him delinquent on all counts. T.K.W. appealed, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support his identity as a participant in either incident and that the prosecution failed to prove the requisite intent for each offense.

The Court’s Holding

The Court of Appeals affirmed the adjudication on all counts. On the menacing convictions, the court found ample evidence identifying T.K.W. as one of the two masked individuals — including eyewitness testimony from R.B. and C.R., statements from another friend that T.K.W. admitted to being in the video, and the victims’ own identification of him. The court further held that intent to place the victims in fear could be reasonably inferred from the circumstances, including the prior threatening texts, the brandishing of a firearm at the door, and the female occupant’s testimony that she feared for her life. The jury’s rejection of T.K.W.’s “warning” theory was supported by the record and not subject to appellate second-guessing.

On the attempted extreme indifference assault conviction, the court held that, even though T.K.W. was not proven to have personally fired a weapon, personal use of a gun is not an element of the offense. The court concluded sufficient evidence supported the verdict under a complicity theory — even though the prosecution had not argued complicity and the trial court had not instructed the jury on it. Citing established Colorado precedent, the court explained that sufficiency is measured against the elements of the offense, not the theories argued at trial. The evidence permitted a reasonable jury to find that T.K.W. incited C.R. to retaliate by telling him about the racial slur, with awareness that C.R. would respond by shooting at the house — conduct manifesting extreme indifference to human life.

The court declined to act as a “thirteenth juror” on any of the contested factual questions, emphasizing that credibility determinations and resolution of evidentiary conflicts are exclusively the jury’s domain.

Key Takeaways

  • Sufficiency of evidence is measured against the statutory elements of the offense, not the theories the prosecution chose to argue at trial — a conviction can be affirmed on a complicity theory even absent a complicity jury instruction, so long as the evidence supports it.
  • Personal use of a firearm is not an element of attempted first degree extreme indifference assault; a defendant may be convicted as a complicitor if the evidence shows he encouraged or aided another’s conduct that manifested extreme indifference to human life.
  • Intent for menacing may be proven entirely through circumstantial evidence, including the victim’s reaction and the surrounding circumstances, without direct evidence of the defendant’s subjective state of mind.
  • Appellate courts reviewing sufficiency of evidence view the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution and will not disturb jury findings supported by substantial evidence, even where conflicting testimony or recantations exist.

Why It Matters

This unpublished decision illustrates the breadth of complicity liability in Colorado criminal cases — and by extension juvenile delinquency proceedings — particularly in the context of gang- or group-involved violence. Prosecutors can secure a conviction for extreme indifference assault based on a defendant’s role in instigating or encouraging the underlying conduct, even when the defendant did not personally fire a weapon and even when complicity was not the theory advanced at trial. Defense counsel handling similar cases must be alert to the risk that sufficiency review will be conducted against the full range of legally available theories, not just those the jury was instructed on.

The case also reinforces that post-incident conduct — here, a taunting text message sent immediately after the shooting — is fair game as circumstantial evidence of intent and identity. In juvenile proceedings especially, where adjudications can have lasting collateral consequences, the court’s refusal to require direct evidence of participation or intent underscores the importance of thorough pretrial investigation and aggressive cross-examination of cooperating witnesses.

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